Abrams tanks can help Ukraine's war effort — but only if effectively utilised

Questions among military leaders surround how Ukraine will integrate the tanks into its joint weapons system and then, how it will maximise its capabilities. There are also implications from Ukraine's lack of air superiority, which may make them vulnerable.

Read more: Will Ukraine's acquisition of F-16s actually tip the scales of war?

There are strategic problems as well.

Russia has deployed many of its tanks during the war, and there have been catastrophic losses sustained by armour in general during the 19 months of the war. It seems that advances in missile and drone technologies have diminished the role of tanks on the modern battlefield.

Some analysts argue that the extent of tank losses – also suffered by Russia in the initial phase of its invasion – came from how they were deployed, rather than revealing fundamental problems over the role of tanks in modern warfare.  

Russian leaders have been criticised for poor planning and logistical preparation. Tank units were routinely deployed in vulnerable positions without sufficient infantry support to protect them from anti-tank weapons or the growing threat of drone strikes.

Advocates of armoured vehicles on the modern battlefield say poor strategy should not overshadow the need for tanks to breach lines and liberate territory. With better tactics and air support, armour can still be useful.

And abandoning the use of tanks would have dire consequences for ground forces.

"Without tanks, armies engaged in large-scale ground warfare would have to rely on armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles to perform the same role, which could lead to catastrophic losses," Rob Lee, a researcher at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, explains.

"It is premature to eliminate the role of the tank, and we must resist jumping to categorical conclusions about the future of warfare based on a conflict whose lessons have not yet become clear."

Ukraine has only deployed a few of its acquired modern combat tanks. According to reports from late August, it lost only five out of 71 Leopard 2 tanks in the 13 weeks following its counterattack to push back Russian lines.

Timing is key

Ukrainian leaders are awaiting the appropriate timing to employ their reinforced armoured forces. While well-prepared Russian defensive positions in southern Ukraine continue to pose a substantial obstacle, the flat and open terrain behind those lines may prove ideal for tanks if Ukrainian forces can get past the defences.

Progress of its counteroffensive so far appears slow and costly but is relatively steady.

There is a need to clear deep minefields at each stage before armoured personnel carriers and tanks can move forward. Limited breaches have been achieved but remain highly contested, as Russia has deployed significant reinforcements to prevent further Ukrainian advances.

The density of minefields near the first Russian defensive lines means that Abrams tanks and other modern Western armoured vehicles won't be able to play a prominent role in offensive operations for now.

This situation will only change if Ukrainian tanks can push past Russia's initial defence lines and push towards less fortified areas.

Having Abrams tanks is not enough. How they are used will determine whether they are a potentially transformational factor or, as some suggest, no more than a symbol.

Whatever else, the 31 advanced combat vehicles are a significant addition to Ukraine's forces. But integration will be key. Joint warfare operations are complex, with drone warfare adding more uncertainty in skies that Ukraine does not control.

 "Tanks must be used for particular and well-designed operations because if used on the frontlines and in joint warfare only, they will not survive for long on the battlefield. They must be used with great care," Kirill Bogdanov, the head of Ukrainian military intelligence, has said.

Undoubtedly, the arrival of Abrams tanks is a welcome sign for Kyiv and can help bolster gains. But it cannot significantly alter the battlefield scene, especially with Leopard 2 and Challenger 2 tanks already deployed.

Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, former British Royal Tank Regiment commander, says the Abrams tanks are "more important at the psychological level than perhaps militarily".

But he adds that the tanks have arrived at a "truly pivotal moment," where Russia's position in the Crimean Peninsula is "becoming less sustainable by the day," citing events in Sevastopol, including losses suffered by the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, submarines, and ships.

But unlocking the advantages of the Western tanks requires support from the air, or at least from long-range missiles.

Johan Michel, an International Institute for Strategic Studies analyst, says: "Ukraine faces many difficulties at the moment because it does not have air superiority. Crossing or defeating heavily fortified positions without air superiority becomes painful and costly."

Sophisticated weaponry and Russian adaptation

Now the US has sent advanced tanks – and the UK and France have provided long-range weapons capable of reaching inside Russia, including Storm Shadow Cruise missiles – questions centre on the possibility of Washington granting Kyiv's request (since last year) for similar long-range ATACMS missiles.

The Kremlin says the weaponry, like the Abrams tanks, will not change the situation on the battlefield.

In response to a question on this matter at a regular press conference, Dmitry Peskov, the Kremlin spokesperson, said: "The Russian armed forces continuously adapt to the use of new types of weapons."

 "All of this cannot affect the essence of the operation and its results. There is no magic cure, and there is no one type of weapon that can change the balance of power on the battlefield … Abrams will also face destruction."

Concerns about provoking further Russian escalation are still restraining Washington's willingness to provide tactical missile systems which could disable supply lines, air bases, and rail networks in Russian-occupied territories.

The Ukrainian military successfully shifted the battle to regions under Russian control, such as the Crimean Peninsula, thanks to long-range weapons, without significant escalation in response. Their tanks managed to cross the Russian defensive line in western Zaporizhia despite anti-tank trench networks and artillery fire.

Indeed, the Abrams' capabilities make it a formidable addition to the Challenger 2 and Leopard 2 tanks. As well as the need to integrate it into operations, success will depend on timing, not least making the most of the remaining few weeks before autumn rains impact the battlefield, turning dry ground into mud and making Abrams tanks and Bradley and Stryker combat vehicles' progress more challenging.

Some American officials believe Kyiv can continue to advance through light and mobile attacks, not pinning high hopes on an all-encompassing counter-offensive.

Sustained support from the West, especially the US, could provide Ukraine with enough tanks to launch simultaneous counterattacks on multiple fronts, dispersing Russian missile efforts and succeeding in reaching the Sea of Azov coastline.

Simultaneously, naval attacks exposing the Russian fleet in the Black Sea to submarine and ship losses would open the path to the Kerch Strait bridge, which could be a crucial turning point in the war.

Read more: Ukraine offensive makes waves in the Black Sea

Four-week deadline

There seems to be a clear Russian desire to move beyond a reactive phase of responding to Western reinforcements and take control of the conflict. Russia's President Vladimir Putin said of Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu: "He has four weeks to halt the counteroffensive".

The war on the ground has been in a stalemate for some time. Support for Ukraine from the West was resolute but also inconsistent.

Planning was diffuse, with requests for weaponry, granted or not, lacking precision regarding what might shift the balance of the battlefield. The systems donated were incongruous. Military planning was not rooted in the available means, with ambition measured by supply capability. This was evident on the ground.

The golden rule for the success of any offensive operation is based on achieving a clear superiority in the balance of ground forces' firepower, and achieving equality in air control. If there is no ability to achieve superiority, relying on waves of dozens of tanks randomly entering the battlefield will not work.

Ukraine's allies must recognise that the existing balance of power does not allow for successful attacks. Kyiv's tactics need to change.

Asymmetrical alternative

Ukrainian leaders acknowledge the difficulty of breaking through Russian defensive lines and anti-armour trench networks, which have led to the destruction of attacking tanks. The situation requires stepping back and changing the style of confrontation.

Asymmetrical warfare techniques – or asymmetric engagement – are needed. This model is used when the combatants' resources and military capabilities are uneven, and their tactics differ significantly. The weaker side exploits the relative weaknesses of the other party to compensate for its deficiencies and achieve success.

Stripping Russian forces of their strengths requires displacing them from their fortified positions.

This involves two techniques: The first is to direct Ukrainian efforts towards launching intensive special operations on the rear lines of Russian forces, targeting their command centres, logistic bases, and reserve sites and curbing the spread of their forces.

This will lead to the dispersion of Russian efforts, a weakening of their defences, and forcing them to adjust their defensive system to protect their forces.

The second is to halt Ukrainian attacks across the front lines, which would encourage Russian forces to leave their positions and launch an offensive in Ukrainian territory. The region's geography allows for luring Russian tanks into prepared ambushes and minefields.

In this manoeuvre, maximum advantage can be taken of the capabilities of American, British, and German tanks since opportunities are equal in confronting Russian tanks outside their defensive positions.

Lessons from history

Modern history includes more than one successful confrontation between a superior army and a weaker one that managed to use limited resources to achieve victory.

The Vietnam experience – especially the French defeat in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu – and the earlier Russian experience in Leningrad provide several relevant lessons. They extend beyond adopting a combat model and are rooted in developing a political and economic strategy capable of sustaining a long-term conflict.

They also rely on a balanced diplomatic role for Ukraine's friends and allies worldwide, capable of harnessing international public opinion and international institutions.