One year has passed since Israel waged war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. It is a period long enough to test and evaluate the war, its effects and strategies of both sides. The war began after a period of escalation where rockets were launched from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel after the expiry of the truce/ceasefire between the two parties, which lasted for six months. Hamas had also refused to extend the ceasefire which had been agreed with Israel through Egyptian mediation.
For Hamas, the terms of the ceasefire were not acceptable and the movement believed that escalation would help it strike a new agreement on better terms. In addition, Hamas thought that threatening to renew the conflict could force all parties to engage with the movement as a representative of the Palestinians and a de-facto authority that enjoys legitimacy in Gaza. Hamas also considered the possibility this would help to negotiate a new agreement for the crossings which facilitates the movement of goods and people across the borders of the besieged Gaza Strip. This agreement had on the crossings had collapsed with the departure of the Palestinian National Authority from the Gaza Strip.
Israel launched the war under the emblem of halting rocket attacks from Gaza, although some Israeli officials spoke of more ambitious goals, including eliminating the authority of Hamas in Gaza. The war has ended without the downfall of Hamas, though it stopped the launching of rockets from Gaza into Israel. The two parties have not reached a new deal for a truce/ceasefire, and the previous agreement was not renewed. The relationship between Israel and Gaza Strip went back as it was during the truce agreement, but this time without any deal or legal framework that protects and regulates the situation.
Israel went on to expand its movement and held an agreement with the United States to impose a ban on admitting weapons into the Gaza Strip through intelligence and naval operations. These operations include a wide area stretching from the Mediterranean to the Gulf. Moreover, several countries participated in implementing this ban.
The only change in Israeli behaviour towards the Gaza Strip was reducing the frequency of Israeli attacks against Hamas militants in Gaza, which eased the tension. After the Gaza war, the political/military game between Hamas and Israel became governed by news rules. Under these rules, Israel would refrain from attacking Hamas militants inside the Gaza Strip as long as they do not pose a direct threat to Israel, meaning when they are not on their way to carry out attacks against Israel.
Moreover, the new rules would give Hamas training and tactical activities within the strip a higher degree of immunity against Israeli attacks. However, Israel has continued sporadic attacks on the tunnels that cross the Gaza border into Egypt. The Israeli attacks on the tunnels were intermittent and did not target all the tunnels, but only those which were used to transfer arms and military equipment to the strip.
The new terms of relationship between Israel and Hamas would provide protection from Israeli attacks for the activities of transporting goods and civilians commodities through the tunnels into the Gaza Strip, which compensated for the continued closure of border crossings connecting Israel and Gaza.
The severe shortage of goods, medicines and other civilian supplies in the Gaza Strip has eased.
This shortage has characterized the period of truce preceding the war. However, the constraints became more stringent with respect to goods that Israel considered to be of dual-use. Israel was expanding its definition of dual-use goods to include building materials, which did not permit re-building of what the war has damaged in the strip.
The only type of goods, which Israel committed itself to provide the strip through the crossings is the fuel needed to run power plants in Gaza. In addition, part of the needs of the Gaza Strip from vehicle fuel came from Israel, while the rest was being smuggled through the complex network of tunnels equipped with pumps through its border with Egypt.
The current rules governing the relationship between Israel and Hamas in Gaza have been reached through Egyptian mediation during the war and in the weeks that followed. The Egyptian mediation has not resulted in reaching a written agreement due to the stringent conditions and unrealistic demands by both parties.
The Gaza war changed the rules of the political game between Hamas and Israel, but not to the extent that allows one of the two parties to claim victory in this war. Israel has achieved a greater degree of security for the southern towns near the Gaza border, but does not guarantee the halt of Palestinian attacks from the Gaza Strip. Hamas's power did not collapse under the pressure of the Israeli attack and the latter does not have any remaining soldiers inside the strip.
Hamas is likely to have restored the weapons it lost during the war, and to have added new weapons to its arsenal. However, the blockade at the border and in the sea has slowed considerably the rate of development of Hamas military force. Israel is cautiously watching the evolution of Hamas military force, but wishes not to find itself compelled to breach an understanding of its relationship with Hamas through a pre-emptive strike against the growing military strength of Hamas.
The state of no-war that prevails between Israel and Hamas over the last year is too fragile and threatens to explode at any time. If Hamas reaches a level of armament that is difficult for Israel to tolerate, or if Hamas comes under pressure due to its ambiguous style of dealing with the current situation, it might open the door to renewed fighting.
Dr Gamal Abdel Gawad - Director of Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies
