With the end of the July 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, and after disproportionate warfare capabilities materialized in creating a balance to deter aggression, the Syrian foreign policy moved to the tactic of calming the situation, and curbing the adventure tendencies of the Bush administration. In addition, the Syrian diplomacy created a host of axes to regain the initiative after the other side showed complete confusion and its inability to produce new policies that would lift it from its regional predicament. Therefore, initiatives were launched from mediators who wished to calm the situation and curb the serial collapse of the Bush administration. Thus, Syria launched an initiative along with a number of Arab States, France and Turkey, to revive the peace process, lift Lebanon out of its regional impasse, and help the Iraqi people to liberate their land and rebuild their nation.
As the Bush policy gradually lost supporters at home and abroad, Syria felt more comfortable. It began gradually to mend the rift in Arab coordination, even at the minimum level. In these circumstances, and despite the accumulated difficulties that clouded the Arab atmosphere and negative speculations, the Arab economic summit in Kuwait represented an important occasion to lay the foundation to restore the previous momentum of the Saudi-Syrian relations. This came in the light of the historic position taken by King Abdullah during the Kuwait summit, when he threatened to withdraw the Arab initiative. King Abdullah’s attitude asserted an important fact that gives way to re-establish a new stage of Arab relations in the post-Bush era.
Consequently, it was inevitable for Syria to note the rise of new regional powers in the region which base their rise on the current regional vacuum. After the previous system in the region sustained a critical damage through the Arabs' difference and their national security on the concept of resistance and the U.S. role after the September 11 events, rising powers in the Middle East consolidated their positions by benefiting from several factors. The most notable ones were the inability of the United States to continue its policies of direct involvement in the region and its practical transition to naval operations after it clearly emerged that the unbalanced war was successful in deterring the aggression and showed the limits of the actual strength of the United States.
It was clear since unveiling the Baker-Hamilton report that the United States would tend in the post-Bush era to use a smart power which is based on delegating some of its rising regional allies to settle the region's affairs and manage their common political goals. In addition, the U.S. policy lost control over regional and international crises and its ability to determine the consequences of their policies declined. Moreover, the world shifted to the multi-polar system, especially after the outbreak of the global economic crisis.
Given these developments, and with the focus of the international conflict shifting to the Middle East and especially the Gulf, where major international crises are intertwined, Syria realized that there was a new transition in the view of the Western powers to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has become a burden on its policies that aimed at building a regional system of security and peace centred on the Western military presence in the Gulf and the closure of the Gulf region in the face of rising international powers.
Thus, the regional contradiction became apparent. Although the region has become the focus of international conflicts, the Western powers have become less able to manage conflict there. Moreover, they became even compelled to reach a regional consensus strategy to achieve their interests. This attitude allowed the emerging regional countries such as Turkey to take the initiative and seek to consolidate its regional influence and role and consolidate alliances with other emerging powers in an attempt to fill the vacuum caused by the American strategic retreat and dispersion of Arab coordination. Within this complex scene, Syria found itself compelled to adopt a multi-side policy that takes into account the possibility of the area turning towards a regional conflict on the one hand, and the need to search for opportunities for peace and to continue with previous policies to boost and strengthen the gains achieved on the other hand.
Syria bases its moves on a central idea that deems all conflicts in the region are not genuine (except for the Arab-Israeli conflict as a colonial project of a special type). They are rather remnants of the colonial era or the direct result of persistent interventions by these powers to achieve their interests. Thereby, Syria acted to totally eliminate its regional differences through diplomatic and political work. This logic allows Syria to redefine its regional, strategic, political and economic role, both in regard to the reconstruction of Iraq and building it as a national Arab state. Syria cannot tolerate another weak sectarian state on its eastern border, or what relates to its regional role as a bridge, a depot and a transport means for energy and water in the region and towards Europe.
The Golan Heights, national and regional development are the main concerns for Syria's foreign policy. Therefore, it kept the effort to prove that the Arab-Israeli conflict can not be closed unless on the basis of a just and comprehensive solution. Everyone working in this direction should be supported. On the other hand, Syria's second concern is pushing the development process by opening the prospects for regional alliances. This process would extend its economic scope from the southern Volga (given the reconciliation process between Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan) to the Arab Gulf, as well as the borders of Pakistan and Europe. Of course Syria is not looking forward to achieve this vital field individually, but through a series of alliances with emerging powers, stretching its hand to Arabs neighbours and surrounding Islamic countries. It is a multi-polar and multi-layered policy, which tries to balance between the risks of war imposed on Syria and development priorities and opportunities.
Syrian Political Analyst
