Aaron David Miller is a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He is also a former adviser on Arab-Israeli negotiations for both Republican and Democratic United States Secretaries of State. Having worked in the State Department for twenty years, he was involved in US attempts to broker consensus between Syria, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians. Miller’s last published book (his fourth one) is titled The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace (2008). At present, Miller is working on another book, due for publication by Bantam Books in 2012, about whether the world can ever expect another great American president. He spoke with The Majalla about Syria’s growing clout in the Middle East, the state of play between Israel and the Arab states – Syria in particular – and the prospects for a revival of the peace process.
The Majalla: Why, in your opinion, has the U.S. been so slow to appoint a new ambassador to Damascus?
I never looked at that as a consequential symbol or statement of significance. It’s more an instrument of diplomacy. It’s an issue of process, not of substance, and I don’t believe there are major policies issues standing in the way of this administration’s decision to do so or put it another way, should be.
The Majalla: You’ve argued for the U.S. and other interested parties in the Middle East to pursue an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement as a more viable prospect than the Israeli-Palestinian track for now. How do you see that shaping up?
Obviously, it’s hard to know what the diplomatic tick-tock has been, both with respect to Turkish-mediated or Turkish-facilitated negotiations or how they relate to whatever Israel and Syria are doing on their own. I continue to think it’s easier to negotiate an Israeli-Syrian agreement than it would be an Israeli Palestinian one, at least on paper. It involves four core issues – withdrawal, normalization, security, water, and of course a fifth issue, the sequence of normalization and withdrawal and how it would be set up. None of these issues in my judgment on paper are deal breakers. They are much easer to deal with than Jerusalem, refuges borders or even security when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian track.
What has happened in negotiations is complicated by the fact that the merits of the case – land for peace – is no longer a sufficient trade off. The Israelis will demand and the U.S. will support off-the-table issues as well, that is to say clearly some kind of Syrian effort to deal with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine. Iran, the Syria-Iran equation, will also be factored in. That makes the process towards an agreement much more difficult. The Israelis will want a certain distancing of Syria from its activist security relations with Hamas and Hezbollah, and from Iran. So gone are the days when it would have been good enough to secure an agreement for bilateral reasons. It is now fundamentally tied up with broader issues and broader threats and to a large degree the Israelis will find real support in Washington for this broader approach.
The Majalla: Are the two sides willing to negotiate?
The way things look now to me, I don’t see much of an Israeli incentive or motive in engaging with the Syrians unless it’s as part of a broader, complex equation to wean them away from Iranians and that will be very difficult to do. The Syria-Iranian relationship has outlasted any Arab alliance in modern Middle East history. It is driven by real needs and interests. They are not ideological competitors like the Egyptian-Syrian alliance, which suggests this relationship is important to both sides. Syria is reluctant to abandon it and will not abandon it. These are hard, fast issues and hard, fast interests and they’ll keep this relationship intact for some time to come.
The Majalla: Plus, there is little urgency on either side of the Syrian-Israeli divide to cut a deal.
Urgency is one of the motivating factors for why negotiations get launched and succeed and there is no urgency now. There is no prospect of pain, no prospect of gain. It would take an Israeli or a Syrian, someone who decides to inject a sense of urgency, to discreetly and quietly negotiate – and bilaterally, without a third party. I can’t see much of a prospect for this.
The Majalla: It doesn’t help that the U.S. and Israel appear to be at loggerheads over President Obama’s earlier demand for a freeze on new settlements in the West Bank.
The administration set itself up for that. It articulated an objective it could never be achieved, a comprehensive freeze including natural growth. What it did get would have been viewed as far below what it asked for, which is never good. As year one ticks down on the Obama administration’s first year, it has three “no’s”: No from Israel on the settlement freeze, No from the Arab states on partial normalization, and No from the Palestinians for a return to negotiations.
The Majalla: Does the paralysis on the Palestinian-Israeli front inhibit movement on the Israeli-Syrian track?
That’s a matter of opinion. Many people say the Syrians cannot negotiate with Israel while the Israel-Palestinian track is in crisis, that Damascus is confined by its own image, or for the sake of its “street cred [credibility]” it cannot be seen cutting a deal the way the Egyptians did. I think that’s by and large probably right. I don’t see much chance of an Israeli-Syrian agreement unless it is fundamentally tied to improvement with the U.S. relationship, which is what they want in addition to the Golan Heights, as a compensation package. Presumably they will move away from Iran, so they’ll need billions of dollars in return, plus the presence of American forces on the Golan. They’ll have to adopt a new relationship with Hamas and Hezbollah. What will be needed is the borrowing of a page from the Egyptians and the Jordanians and even the Palestinians to understand their relationship with Washington fundamentally changes once you’ve made an agreement with Israel. You want things to change because you need America as a serious patron and a donor. The question is, and here is where I bump into a brick wall: Syria is not like the other Arab regimes and states that cut deals with Israel. It is not homogenous. It did not have a history as the Jordanians did with Britain and then with the U.S. It is not as dependent on the U.S. as the Palestinians have become. It’s a state with a profound sense of entitlement, driven by ideology and dynasty, and a profound sense of insecurity and that makes the U.S.-Syria relationship very complicated and it’s hard for me to see a transition for Damascus to an agreement that would be similar to those states that went before it. I can’t get my mind around how this may happen. There are so many anomalies and entanglements.
The Majalla: What about Lebanon?
Bashar Al Assad is clearly dealing from a position of great strength and confidence right now. Syrian influence in Lebanon, even though its forces have been withdrawn, is higher than it has been in the last several years. I don’t see people beating the drum on the investigation [into Prime Minister Hariri’s murder]. Despite the outcome of the recent elections, the competing political movements seem to have checked each other, and it seems Hezbollah and [Christian Phalange leader Michel Aoun] to a large degree have benefited. Bashar Al Assad is quite comfortable.
The Majalla: Has he succeeded in phasing out elements of his father’s regime?
Reading Syria’s internal politics is difficult, but confidence seems to be flowing from a greater sense of security and authority and maybe of legitimacy.
The Majalla: This all sounds perfectly dreadful.
Yeah, I’m pretty forlorn on the prospects for a breakthrough on the Israel-Syria track. Would I be surprised if I were to open the Washington Post next week and read that Israel and Syria have been holding secret talks and there’s been great progress? No. On paper it has always been easier, as it does not involve the emotional, ideological, and religious complexity of U.S.-Palestinian track. Nor is there the raw proximity of the Israel-Palestinian track. You have two states which clearly have the capacity to control the forces of violence in their society. Damascus controls all the guns. That’s one of the luxuries of authoritarianism, a high degree of centralized control. But I’m not terribly upbeat. In government, we approached everyone from three angles: Option number one was Armageddon. Option number two was peace breaking out. Option number three was muddling through. It seems we will be in for option number three for some time in the future.
