The Houthi phenomenon belongs to the Zaidi school of thought, which dates back to 1986. This school of thought first emerged in the governorate of Saada, where the largest concentrations of Zaidis in Yemen exist. In Saada, the "Youth Union", a body aimed at teaching the Zaidi doctrine to its adherents, was established.
Houthis represent an underground rebel movement that seceded from the Zaidi sect. It is religiously and politically based on the model of Hezbollah in Lebanon. It embraces the ideas and beliefs of the Twelver Shiites and was first led by Hussein Badr Eddin Al-Houthi. Its members adopted the name, "Al-Shabaab Al-Mominin" (the organization of Youthful Believers).
The year 1990 witnessed the unity of Yemen which paved the way for a multi-partisan system. The "Youth Union" restructured itself into the "Truth" Party (Al-Haq), which now represents the Zaidi community in Yemen. Hussein Badr Eddin Al-Houthi, the son of Badr Eddin Al-Houthi, was one of the most prominent political leaders of this party.
Despite the absence of Badr Eddin Al-Houthi from the Yemeni political arena, his ideas continued to spread, particularly in Saada and its surrounding areas since the late 1990s. Meanwhile, his son Hussein Badr Eddin Al-Houthi seceded from the "Truth" Party and formed a private group known as the "Youthful Believers". This group was at first an intellectual and religious group. It was founded in 1990 and continued to practice politics in secret while preaching religion on the surface. But in 2002, the group adopted an opposing stance towards the government.
According to its former Secretary-General, Muhammad Yahya Salem Azzan, the group's objectives at that stage were focused on providing the youth with a good education of Zaidi principles, developing their creative talents in various fields. More importantly, they were dedicated to creating a young generation of religious preachers that would be culturally, morally, and spiritually prepared to raise awareness and advocate virtue, according to the vision of the Zaidi sect.
The stage of armed confrontation
In 2004, the Youthful Believers began a phase of armed confrontation which marked the beginning of the Houthi Group as a rebel force. These militias fought five wars against the Yemeni army over a period of more than four years. These wars resulted in a major national crisis, the consequences of which have become clear during the current sixth war.
Hussein Badr Eddin Al-Houthi had visited Iran with his father and stayed for several months in Qom. In addition, it is known that he was deeply influenced by the Khomeini revolution in Iran. He attended many sessions on security and politics in Lebanon organized by Hezbollah. He has a strong relationship with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and raised slogans of support for Hezbollah. He led a rebellion against the government of Yemen, and was killed in the first war (2004), aged 46.
The second leader of the Houthis is Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi. Having surpassed other prominent figures in the movement including a number of his elder brothers, Abdul-Malik took command of the group after the death of his brother Hussein.
Presently, the conflict in Yemen has become the main concern for many observers in the region, particularly since the insurgents are believed to be strongly connected with Iran. Observers have tried dissecting this relationship and the circumstances in which it developed, by evaluating the beneficial relationship between the regional power and the insurgents it supports. These two actors do not share a common structure or function, nor are they geographical neighbours.
The prospects for the formation of a strong "organic" relationship that is based on a high degree of trust, between the Houthi group, with its Zaidi revival trend, and Iran seem unlikely.
This is mainly due to the fact that Yemen’s Zaidis are traditionally opposed to Iran’s Twelver Shiism.
However, since the Islamic revolution, Iran has been trying to promote itself as the "only" legitimate umbrella for all the Shiites of the region. Yet, the nuanced interests of the Houthis and Iran do not help in understanding the context in which a symbiotic relationship between the two grew. It is a multi-dimensional and complex context that is not necessarily mutual. It has grown over a relatively long period, and more specifically, during the last two decades.
Iran's secret support
The relationship between the Houthis and Iran might have started at an early time. Some say that it goes back to the early 1980s, when many Yemeni Zaidis were influenced by the Iranian revolution. This relationship, however, has become influential and functional only in recent years. This does not mean that no relationship existed previously. It only means that it was a limited intellectual relationship through non-official Iranian channels.
Hussein Al-Houthi was influenced by Iran's revolutionary discourse and its political ideology; not necessarily its religious ideology. This led to a shift in the movement's trend. The group started to focus on organized polarization under a strong inclination towards rebellion. The desire was further reinforced through the campaign launched by the United States against international terrorism, following the 9/11 attacks. Al-Houthi viewed this campaign with great suspicion, considering it a war against "Islam and Muslims."
As a result of his growing sense of power, the spread of his movement and its increasing strength, Al-Houthi began to train the young members of the movement for combat. He started creating educational channels away from the supervision of the Yemeni state. He began to incite the members of the movement against official institutions, describing them as illegitimate organizations.
In a parallel trend, Al-Houthi and the elements of his movement launched their famous slogan "God is Great, death to America, death to Israel, the curse on the Jews, victory for Islam". This slogan, which became widely associated with the group, and the way it was launched - by repeating the slogan in the mosques after prayers and writing it on the walls in the streets and public squares - made it clear that it was drawn from a non-Yemeni source, most likely to have originated from Iran. It was also very similar to the approach adopted by Hezbollah. It is a mobilizing method aimed at continuously inciting the members of the movement, and making them feel unique and distinguished from the members of other political parties and groups. It also reflects totalitarian methods of political recruitment.
Al-Houthi next began to search for supporters and backers, both internally and externally, for his armed organization. The rugged mountains of the northern province of Saada, near the Saudi border, were the Houthis safe haven. The rebels started stockpiling weapons in abandoned caves scattered across these mountains.
The author of the book "Flowers and Stones: The Shi'ite Revolt in Yemen" mentions that Al-Houthi has managed to obtain huge material and logistical assistance from local and foreign parties, including Shiite associations and organizations that have extensions in Iran or ties with it.
According to the same source, some of the most important parties that have provided material and intellectual support to the Houthis are: Ansarin Foundation (Iranian Qom), Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei (London), Zaid bin Ali Foundation (Jordan), Thaqalin Foundation (Kuwait), Al -Bait Association (London), organizations controlled by Hezbollah, Sadeq Shirazi (Kuwait), Al-Alfein Company (Kuwait), branch of Al-Bait Foundation (Syria, Lebanon, Iraq), and the Al Association (Kuwait).
Moreover, the Houthis received aid granted by the Iranian embassy in Sana'a, and one aid bill amounted to $650,000 dollars. The Iranian embassy also donated support to summer centers worth 22,381,000 Yemeni riyals between 2000 and 2002. Some of this money has been allocated for financing a number of educational courses, particularly in the province of Saada, where the Houthi movement is based. Some sources allege that Hussein Al-Houthi was using the funds he obtained to pay some of his supporters. He also focused on providing social aid and charity, especially in areas dominated by his movement and supporters.
Although the movement was shaken violently, almost to the brink of collapse, by the death of Hussein Al-Houthi in 2004, it quickly regained its balance after his younger brother Abdel Malik al-Houthi assumed command.
He worked on the reconstruction of the movement, assuming the same approach and discourse adopted by Hussein. There is no doubt that the process of rebuilding the movement, despite its complications in the beginning, also necessitated searching for supporters inside and outside Yemen. Moreover, it resumed relations with supporting parties, which had become disconnected during the temporary collapse of the movement, after the death of its founder. These associations have developed and become stronger than ever.
Al-Houthi's confession
Despite the repeated denials by Abdel Malik Al-Houthi of any Iranian role in supporting his movement, recent evidence has grown putting Malik Al Houthi’s declarations into question. The political representative of the Houthis abroad, Yahya Al-Houthi, implied in one of his press interviews that his group has opened communication channels with the Iranian leadership. He stated that he sees Iran as a "hope for the humiliated people in oppressed nations." He also stressed that "All those who belonged to the Prophet's House should prove the credibility of their fellowship by following the Prophet's teachings, and apply them in reality."
Unprecedented and biased coverage by the Iranian official media of the events of Saada has boosted the accusations that Iran is supporting the Houthis. The media featured TV channels like Al-Alam, Tehran Radio, and other satellite channels close to Iran such as Al-Manar, Al-Zahra, Al Kawthar and others.
It is certain that Iran has a clear interest in increasing the strength of the Houthis, who are ideologically close to it and could be recruited - one way or another - to achieve different objectives that would help promote Iran’s national interests.
Against this backdrop, the information reported by sources in the Eritrean opposition is particularly important. They revealed the existence of a training camp for members of the Houthis under Iranian support and supervision in Dengolo, east of Ginda in central Eritrea. In addition, the implicit Yemeni government accusations against Iran of backing the Houthi insurgents and providing them with weapons through the Midi port - on the Red Sea at the north-west tip of Yemen - have recently increased. There was also information about an Iranian request to the Yemeni government to activate the Midi port in the form of Iranian investments, but the Yemeni government rejected this request.
Moreover, the media reported that in late October the Yemeni navy detained an Iranian ship loaded with anti-armor weapons, off the coast of Midi. The same sources reported that the ship was on its way to unload its cargo of weapons near the "Harad" area to deliver them to the insurgents. The ship was also carrying weapons experts and trainers to replace Iranian experts and trainers believed to be injured or killed in the fighting.
Relationship with al-Qaeda
The infiltration operations carried out by Houthi elements inside Saudi territories also revealed the close relationship between the Houthis and al-Qaeda. Groups of the latter have also infiltrated Saudi territories alongside the Houthis after previous coordination between the two sides.
The relationship between the Houthis and al Qaeda is not new. Several Yemeni officials have confirmed that the collaboration between the two organizations, which they note, share an interest in creating chaos and instability in Yemen, has existed since before the recent developments in the ongoing war in Saada.
Moreover, the Saudi forces have detected the presence of sophisticated and non-traditional weapons, some of them anti-armor, the presence of which confirms that the Houthis are receiving support at the highest level. In addition, the Houthis follow methods and tactics known to be used by Al-Qaeda such as hiding in women's clothes and some other tricks to penetrate areas behind the front lines of the Saudi army.
Eritrea and Somalia
The support received by the Houthis is not limited to Iran and al-Qaeda, but also comes from Eritrea and Somalia. The arrest of Somalis by Yemeni and Saudi forces near their joint borders, while they were smuggling weapons to the Houthi insurgents in Yemen, is evidence of such connections.
One Eritrean opposition leader and an official in the Eritrean Democratic Alliance, Bashir Ashaq, told the French AFP news agency that Iran uses Eritrea as a base for transferring weapons to the Houthi insurgents in the Yemeni Saada province. He pointed out that the weapons are delivered to the coastal cities of Eritrea, mainly the city of Assab, from where they are then transported by the Houthi rebels to Yemen during the night. In addition, some press reports revealed that dozens of jihadists crossed the Gulf of Aden to Yemen a few months ago; they are believed to have since joined the ranks of the rebel Houthi group in Yemen.
The reports suggested that there is also evidence that the pirate gangs have established ties with local officials in Somalia. There is a strong relationship between pirates and human traffickers to Yemen, where they exchange information. When the traffickers return from transferring Somali refugees to the coast of Yemen, they participate in some piracy operations. Yemen has announced the presence of Somali fighters among the Houthi insurgents in Saada, seven of which have been arrested.
All these factors support the possibility that there are Somali groups trafficking weapons to the Houthi insurgents in Yemen.
Up till now the Yemeni government has not formally charged the Iranian government of backing the insurgents directly. However, Sanaa understands that there is a hard line Iranian leadership that has assumed power in Tehran since 2005. Moreover, since the arrival of Ahmadinejad to the presidency, propaganda against the Sunni minority in Iran has escalated notably, as they consider its members potential agents for Saudi Arabia, and allies of the Sunni extremists in Iraq.
One of the most important and complex dimensions in understanding the Iranian role on the foreign scene is that there is a hidden side to this role that is not conducted through the official state tools. It does not allow the state to be implicated directly, despite serving its foreign objectives to a great extent. This aspect has created confusion in the political arena and decision-making circles in many world capitals. The Iranian presence is evident in many countries of the Middle East, but some of its tools are invisible.
Iran’s hand no longer invisible
Iran has called for a political exit to be found on what is happening in northern Yemen, implying its willingness to recognize the Houthis as a political force in the equation of Yemen. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki expressed his country's concern about the situation of Shiites in Yemen. He was quoted by the Iranian Student News Agency ISNA, on August 27, as saying during a meeting with the Yemeni Ambassador to Tehran that "Iran supports good relations between the Yemeni government and Shiite Houthis in the country." He added: "The Yemeni government and the Houthis can acquire the support of each other through constructive interaction."
Mehdi Snaii, member of the Committee on National Security and foreign policy of the Iranian Parliament said: "The Iranian Foreign Ministry studied the subject, but the parliament is expecting it to deal with the Yemeni issue in a special manner, because we reject tension in neighboring countries and putting pressure on the Shiite minority in the region".
In any case, the relationship between Iran and the Houthi group seems clearer and less ambiguous today and indicates the presence of mutual interests between the two parties. These parties have converged on implementing ambitious geo-strategic projects that go beyond the issue of "justice and equality" and "defending the vulnerable and the oppressed". In the case of the Houthis, the rebel group is aspiring to form an independent Shiite principality in the north of Yemen.
In the case of Iran, this relationship goes beyond seeking the Yemenis’ interests and preventing fighting among them. Iran believes that it is a historic moment for it to regain its role as a major regional power, with extensions everywhere it can reach. Yemen is no exception.
