Afghanistan is probably near to a tipping point. The new US Strategy for AF-PAK (Afghanistan-Pakistan) launched by President Obama on March 27 means several positive steps in the stabilization and pacification of the country, even for the Transatlantic Relations at large. However, this plan arrives at least one year late. The 2008 NATO summit should have established deeper commitments, above all, from the European Allies side. Neither the initial US approach nor the European posture during the first 6 years matched the reality on the ground and the future necessities of Afghanistan. In this vein, the Comprehensive Approach approved in Bucharest offered the first real framework to coordinate every key political, economic, social and military aspect for stabilization.
The US strategy (mainly a counterterrorist approach) and the European’s only Stabilization and Reconstruction approach was not the correct stuff for the country: according to Sun Tzu, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles... If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle”.
The new approach is the result of the White Paper of Interagency Policy Group’s Report on US Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. It takes into account the lessons learned from the errors and successes in the GWOT and Iraq, and leading the strategy to counterinsurgency, after the appointment of Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense and General David Petraeus as USCENTCOM commander. This new approach will be implemented thanks to a so-called integrated approach: the coordination of ISAF-NATO, UNAMA, and the European Union, partner states in the country and the government and institutions of Afghanistan to carry out a triad of interconnected goals as security, development and governance to each district of the country.
This vision does not believe in a purely military solution for Afghanistan. Ultimately, the solution is political and in the Afghans’ hands. Meanwhile, ISAF and ANA (Afghan National Army) forces have to protect the population, creating a secure space for good governance and development through the operational strategy “Shape, Clear, Hold and Build”. This counterinsurgency strategy is defined by unity of effort, primacy of politics, understanding of environment, intelligence-guided operations, isolation of insurgents, security under rule of law, long term commitment, flexibility, suitable management of expectations, and power attribution to the lower levels of the strategy. The reality on the ground makes COIN strategy the suitable mechanisms for an integrated approach to conflict: no development or governance can be build without security, and without the former there will not be legitimacy for the government. The ISAF commander, General McKiernan talked plainly some weeks ago when I was visiting Kabul that the people of Afghanistan was the centre of gravity of the strategy. This is not only an “Afghanization” in terms of more capacities and responsibilities in their hands though, but to ask to the Afghans what they need, and to supply what security, development and governance they really need, not only under the international institutions point of view.
The situation in Afghanistan shows remarkable hurdles for the implementation of the integrated strategy (in progress really since some time ago). The three main points are: lack of coordination and cooperation among the different institutions; the need for “more government” rather than “more governance” in terms of building efficient and cleaner institutions; finally, a clear regional approach and solution.
On the field, ISAF is leading the new strategy, although UNAMA should be the main institution in the country. The problem is its lack of resources and presence in the country. Besides, there is a certain reluctance to follow the lead of a military organization such as NATO at the time of implementing a comprehensive strategy, that includes several reconstruction and governance related elements. However, the capabilities and good management, and the necessity for security in the country have imposed the real leadership of ISAF on the ground. Moreover, the different postures of partner states in the different regions create distortions between real necessities, for instance, paramilitary training for ANP (Afghan National Police) and the real programs carried out for EUPOL or the German Police Training Team. It is a priority to give the suitable training to the ANP because they have suffering the highest level of causalities (60%) in the Afghan security forces.
The lack of proper institutions or even its absence is perhaps the most dangerous problem in short-medium term: no proper training security forces (it is not the case of the ANA, able to carry out the 60% of operations with an ISAF minimum support) or a bad implementation of infrastructure programs, create a perception in the people of lack of commitment. The existence of enough security is a priority and then more troops are necessary (ANA and ISAF troops). The return of Taliban insurgency or drugs-traffickers in certain areas has provoked the socialization of terror to avoid the support of the population to the government and international organizations. Even among the staff of some PRTs (for instance the Swedish-lead PRT in Mazar-i-Sharif) exists the idea that the a priori “only reconstruction and development” approach has been erroneous, and that the first priority is security: the idea was also to change the name of PRT to PST, Provincial Security Teams!
The problem in Afghanistan is that is really a regional conflict. Even if the pacification and reconciliation process among the Afghan forces of the insurgency (maybe 70% of the total) was to be successful, the rest of the Taliban still come from Pakistan. This does not assure the success of the new strategy although the final goal of Obama’s new approach is to end with al-Qaeda in Pakistan and the stabilization of Afghanistan. From this point of view, AF-PAK solution is a bridge too far for some of the European partners, due to its self-imposed caveats. Most of them would be not prepared to stay a long time there and to face a possible campaign across borders if necessary. Sadly, this is a probable prospect for the area: a Taliban force, politically and military more and more capable across Pakistan, creating a security dilemma for its neighbours (Iran and India, for instance) that could push towards an armed conflict in that part of Asia.
