Better under Ben Ali?

Better under Ben Ali?

[caption id="attachment_55246731" align="alignnone" width="620"]Tunisian people sit on stairs outside the theater on Habib Bourguiba Avenue on November 6, 2013 in Tunis. (FETHI BELAID/AFP/Getty Images) Tunisian people sit on stairs outside the theater on Habib Bourguiba Avenue on November 6, 2013, in Tunis. (FETHI BELAID/AFP/Getty Images)[/caption]A specter is haunting Tunisia: the specter of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali. It seems the whole country has entered into a tacit alliance to resurrect his spirit: leftists and liberals, trade unionists and employers, pan-Arabists and nationalists, the peasantry and bourgeoisie, the Jabri (those with poor and rural origins) and Francophonie (the rich, coastal elite).

"It was better under Ben Ali" is a statement now frequently heard on the streets of Tunis—in its cheap coffee shops and fancy bars, among arrogant businessmen and their servants alike. Some lament the privileges they no longer have, but others worry about the state of the economy, their everyday security, and their children’s future. Are they wrong to worry? Not when we consider the facts. Tunisia's central bank is issuing regular warnings about its shrinking reserves, commodity prices are rising, criminality is on the rise, and terrorist attacks are becoming more frequent. Meanwhile the numbers of students dropping out of school is reaching an all-time high and the use of drugs is climbing, from the tiny streets of Tunis’s Centre Ville to inside the most remote rural high schools.

The overriding question is this: Would the return of Ben Ali, or his authoritarian police state, make the country any better? And the answer to that is, simply, no. Inflation began to rise during Ben Ali’s later years, and it was one of the main dissatisfactions behind the popular anger of 2010/11. Tunisia's economy, tightly linked to that of Europe, was feeling the direct consequences of the Euro crisis. Ben Ali's policy was to turn a blind eye to the illicit movement of goods over Tunisia’s borders, paving the way for today’s smuggling of drugs and weapons. Criminality was also high: outside of a few neighborhoods, a girl walking alone would not feel safe after dark. Terrorism was knocking on Tunisia's door many years before 2011. In fact, any problem the country is facing today almost certainly existed under Ben Ali as well. We are experiencing the logical progression of events, and the return of Ben Ali would be as much a remedy for the situation in Tunisia as Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi is for the situation in Egypt.

The "better under Ben Ali" idea is, however, promoted—purposefully or inadvertently—from at least three sides. First, there is an alliance between the former regime's politicians and businessmen, along with security forces and the media industry, which are largely composed of Ben Ali affiliates. They control not only the country’s wealth and its armed forces, but also the mass media. They are the ones who felt the most threatened after the fall of Ben Ali.

A second side is made up of respected figures who opposed Ben Ali and his system. They are largely secular, progressive activists who are not content with the way things went after the Islamists took over. Hence we find liberated prisoners demonstrating with their former torturers against the current government, making a clear statement that the past is past and that the Islamists are worse. It is commonplace to hear or read prestigious Tunisian intellectuals calling for a coup. The second group is, therefore, a source of legitimacy for those reclaiming a return to the previous era.

The third side is composed of workers and peasants, small shopkeepers and administrative agents, poor students and unemployed men and women—in fact, all those struggling to meet their daily needs and whose economic situation has deteriorated. In a sense, this group is a victim of the two previous groups. But they have their own power: they would make up the big numbers should they take to the streets, and they would be the ones risking their lives if violence erupts.

The longer the Islamist Ennahda Party stays in power—and the longer the national dialogue talks to peacefully remove them from power are stalled—the more popular anger will be directed towards its rule. Similarly, people from many sides are harboring nostalgia for the recent past and promoting the image of an idyllic life under Ben Ali, stressing the fact that he banned and jailed the Islamists. The popular anger against the government, which is understandable due to the economic and security conditions, is being channeled into an affection and yearning for a police state. In short, many Ennahda haters are gradually becoming Ben Ali fans.

All views expressed in this blog post are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, The Majalla magazine.
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