20th March 1970: Saddam Hussein (right), Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and Assistant Secretary of the Socialist Arab Ba'ath Party, visits Arbil to meet with Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani, leader of the Kurdistani Democratic Party.[/caption]
Arab politics has been dominated by personalities that are, in some ways, larger-than-life. Examples can be found outside the Gulf in leaders like Gamal Nasser, Anwar Sadat, Hafez Al-Assad, Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qadhafi. Outside of Egypt and Libya, Iraq and pre-uprising Syria, however, were members of a peculiar sub-species of dictatorship: the one-party state.
Although Iraq under the Ba’ath was dominated in so many ways by Saddam Hussein, it was also the exemplar of the one-party state in the Middle East. With the assistance of recent scholarship made possible by the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime, we can now glimpse behind the scenes and see how the Ba’ath Party functioned and how Saddam Hussein used it to keep himself in power. Among the innumerable—and perhaps unforeseen—consequences of the American-led invasion of Iraq was the seizure of thousands of pages of documentation and hundreds of hours of tape recordings from the archives of the Iraqi state. This has allowed scholars, such as Georgetown University’s Joseph Sassoon (author of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime), to piece together an intriguing, and at times surprising, look at the inner workings of an Arab one-party state.
It is something of a cliché to compare any dictatorial regime to the nightmarish totalitarianism envisaged in George Orwell’s novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four, but in a one-party state like Iraq the picture that emerges is in many ways almost as sinister, distinguished from its fictional counterpart only by its inevitable real-world inefficiencies. There was a single party at the centre of power in the country, with its tentacles extending into every aspect of society and politics and into the lives of its members, backed up by incessant spying, and never hesitating to kill, imprison or torture anyone suspected of disloyalty.
[inset_left]“One of the keys to the survival of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party was their mastery of the use of internal security services.”[/inset_left]
While Saddam Hussein was ‘Big Brother’, it was through his mastery of the Party apparatus that he kept himself in this position: he recruited his henchmen from it, it shaped his rule, and it was shaped by him. Perhaps this authoritarianism stems in part from the origins of these parties as revolutionary movements that seized control of the state in coups, after contending for power with dangerous rivals and a repressive state, ruthless, focused, and once in power determined to keep it. As O’Brian, the ruling party’s representative in Orwell’s novel, explains, “One does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; one makes the revolution in order to establish the dictatorship.” Whatever the reasons, any dictatorial one-party state is based on domination: the leader dominates the party, the party dominates its members, its members dominate society.
But how does the party rule? In the cases of Syria and Iraq, the Ba’ath were remarkably successful, taking and keeping power for decades. By the standards of dictatorship, this is quite an achievement. Ba’ath rule in Iraq survived two devastating wars, crippling economic sanctions and internecine struggles for power. For Sassoon, it comes down to a few factors which Saddam Hussein and the leadership of the Ba’ath mastered: it crushed its enemies and rivals with the large, powerful security services it also used to spy on Iraqis at all levels of society, and it bought off and divided everyone else it needed to keep itself in power. In other words, it ruled through paranoia, cruelty and bribery.
The Party Animal
The structure and the internal rules of the ruling party in a one-party state have huge implications for society as a whole, determining how decisions are made, at what pace, and by whom. The party has no incentive to loosen its grip if it wishes to remain in power, and that results in the centralization of authority. In Iraq, the Ba’ath Party secretariat was the center, with policies handed down through a strictly defined hierarchy and information (not always accurate) flowing upwards. This resulted in an extensive bureaucracy that moved at what was frequently a glacial pace, as decisions moved through and up all tiers and offices in the system, with only those at the very top—Saddam Hussein and his immediate underlings—having the final say over virtually every aspect of life in Iraq. This made for a cumbersome system of government, but effectively blocked the development of rival centers of power and influence and allowed Saddam Hussein to keep as much control as possible in his own hands. Ironically, although the Ba’ath Party became perhaps the single most powerful institution in Iraq, it could be a harsh mistress to its members, who were also often individually subject to extensive Party control.
In Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, membership of the Ba’ath was a prerequisite, formal or informal, for many jobs, especially in the public sector. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), for instance, once boasted that it had dismissed 12,000 Iraqi schoolteachers as part of the ‘de-Ba’athification’ process after the American invasion of 2003. By the time of the invasion, it numbered almost 17 percent of Iraq’s population amongst its members, although admittedly many were at the lowest tiers of membership, of which there were several. One of the major goals of the Party was constant recruitment. New blood coming in, after all, allowed the Party to simultaneously renew itself, and bringing new members into itself also meant bringing those people under its control. Members were expected to be totally loyal to the Party, and in ensuring this the Party collected a great deal of information on its members. The questionnaire for new members was quite extensive, and required the applicant to describe his or her personal interests and background, the nature of their introduction to the Ba’ath Party and its ideology, how they felt about it, who their superiors in their branch or cell were, and where they had originally taken the oath of membership, amongst other questions.
All members of the Party seeking to climb up its ranks were subject to particular rules and discipline, and this, in Sassoon’s words, ranged “from the sublime to the ridiculous,” but all of which served to keep members on a tight reign. On joining even the lowest ranks, members were obliged to sign a declaration that stated they would be hanged if they were found to be secret members of any other party. Leaving the Ba’ath and joining a different political party was punished with seven years in prison. Other regulations were less stark, but at the same time more personal. Members required permission from the Party hierarchy to get married, and one of the stages of this process was submitting a great deal of information about the member’s prospective spouse, including details of background and family, even if they too were members in good standing. Members were also chided for being late to meetings, not bringing their notebooks, and were expected to remain physically fit, with those failing medical exams facing demotion. Senior officials were ordered to notify the president’s office of any stays in hospital. Members were also discouraged from playing cards or sitting with their legs crossed. Other things, however, were permitted. Sassoon recounts how attempts to prevent members from celebrating by firing guns into the air as being ‘uncivilised’ were vetoed by Saddam Hussein, who believed that it provided a valuable outlet for self-expression.
Unsurprisingly, the Party also put a lot of effort into indoctrinating its members. Many were required to attend training courses that could last months, and were designed to instil loyalty to the Party and the leader, and further reinforce the ‘Ba’athification’ of Iraqi society. Senior members were sent on courses geared to make them more effective party leaders, while candidates for full membership were there to absorb the Party’s ethos and procedures as well as receive ideological indoctrination. Members were also instructed in the Party’s ‘official line’ on national history, which unsurprisingly emphasised the role of the Party and its leader, and included an extensive study of Saddam Hussein’s speeches and writings and Ba’ath Party congresses. The Party also acted as a channel of indoctrination of the populace at large, and as a means to disseminate Saddam Hussein’s personality cult. For instance, copies of his books were issued to members via branches and cells of the Party on release, and they were the frequently the subject at monthly discussions of cultural topics.
Eyes and Ears
In a one-party state, the party also functions as a system of public surveillance. Its membership and social role make it ideally suited to monitor the population, and this is boosted by its wide grasp: as we saw above, the ruling party often seeks to sweep as many people into its embrace as possible, both for its own health and as a means of control. In Iraq, it was amongst the duties of members of the Ba’ath to keep track of disloyalty amongst the population. Branches were required to create security committees to spy on the regime’s opponents and keep track of potential subversion amongst the population, and within state institutions like the healthcare and education systems. Each school maintained lists of their teachers, who were required to be committed to Ba’ath ideology, and professional associations of medical staff were monitored, as were trade union organizations (until they were shut down and integrated into the Party). The members of the branch security committees, who were issued weapons, were also charged with using their local knowledge to track down and arrest deserters from the military. In addition, party headquarters tasked its branches with tracking down rumours and those who instigated or spread them. The civil service was also placed under the supervision of the Ba’ath Party. Committees of retired or senior Ba’athists were placed in each ministry as ‘watchdogs’ to oversee its work and ensure that it was loyal, even going so far as to appoint separate committees for each regional branch of every ministry.
One of the keys to the survival of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party was their mastery of the use of internal security services. According to Sassoon, the evidence points to a “symbiosis” between the Ba’ath and the various intelligence agencies. In his book, Sassoon paints a picture of ever-present official paranoia and describes no less than four secret police agencies used for spying on the population, aside from other specialised units that watched the military and other institutions for signs of disloyalty. He recounts how this network of organizations was structured in such a way that they overlapped, and none had too much power as a ‘coup-proofing’ measure. The Ba’ath Party itself had its own intelligence unit that was tasked with keeping an eye on all the members—which must have been more than a full-time job, given their number.
The single most powerful of these agencies was the Special Security Organization (Jihaz al-amn al-khass), or SSO, which reported directly to the office of Saddam Hussein. After 1991, it was headed by his son, Qusay. It recruited heavily amongst clans close to Saddam Hussein, especially his own, the Tikritis. It also formed the second tier of his bodyguard, and was responsible for protecting (and, no doubt, watching) senior members of the Ba’ath. In this capacity it put a great deal of effort into spying on the domestic staff of Saddam Hussein and his family. This led them, for example, to discover that the wife of the president’s personal chef was addicted to gambling, and allowed them to infiltrate an agent into her card games at the suggestion of Saddam Hussein himself. It almost goes without saying that the employees of the SSO itself were spied on, and were required to disclose all kinds of personal information about themselves to the organization, even down to which brand of cigarette they smoked. As compensation, and to help ensure their loyalty, they were given access to subsidised housing, education and other fringe benefits.
The power of the organization (even government ministers required its permission to travel abroad) had the same effect on its employees as absolute power seems to have had on Saddam Hussein, and to some extent all dictators: they came to enjoy the impunity and the trappings of power. In one case, officers of the organization helped themselves to pornographic films seized in a raid, and in another, their celebratory gunfire at a football match killed several people. Others were found to have solicited or accepted bribes.
The military was also carefully monitored, and the Ba’ath did its best to inculcate the Iraqi armed forces with its own vision and ideals, and to fill its ranks with its members and supporters. Aside from this, it also created parallel paramilitary forces, including Party militias, to offset the power of the regular army. The most obvious example was the Republican Guard, which functioned as the regime’s praetorians and was practically an army within an army. The most bizarre was the fida’iyyu Saddam, which was set up in the 1990s and seemed to function as a giant death squad under the leadership of Uday Hussein. Its uniform featured a helmet that was reportedly modelled on Darth Vader’s from the Star Wars film franchise, and was inscribed with a picture of Saddam Hussein’s profile.
A separate branch of the Ba’ath Party was established just for members of the armed forces, reporting directly to Party headquarters. In addition, the Ba’ath Party also controlled the admission to the military academies, vetting all candidates for loyalty. As with all other aspects of life in Iraq, loyalty to the Party and Saddam Hussein was rewarded, often with pay rises and other benefits like free medical care for officers and their families, while any perceived disloyalty was severely punished. Eventually, loyalty became the single most important factor in an officer’s career prospects. Some senior officers at the highest levels of the Iraqi military were appointed because they were close to Saddam Hussein, without even having served in the military beforehand.
Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath’s terror of a military coup was well-founded, given Iraq’s history. It meant that the army was spied on as closely as every other institution in Iraq by the internal security agencies. The movements of its units were checked and double checked by the SSO, and, like members of the Ba’ath Party, officers required permission to marry—something which, as Sassoon recounts, was a lengthy and torturous process, with decisions often made at a senior level by high-ranking officers. Reasons for refusing permission seem petty to outsiders, but show just how paranoid and obsessed with security Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath were: Sassoon describes one case in which an officer was refused permission to marry because his fiancée had a relative living abroad.
The Party, the Carrot, and the Stick
In many ways, rewards were as important as punishment (or the threat of it) to maintaining Ba’ath rule. Rewards were doled out to members of the Party for a variety of reasons, such as uninterrupted membership over twenty-five years, service in the military or one of the militias, or other demonstrations of loyalty, usually in the form of a medal or badge from the Party. These rewards varied, but by using them the Ba’ath was able to “co-opt a large number of individuals by making it advantageous, both to those who became part of the organization and even to those who were outside of it, to continue supporting the regime,” to use Sassoon’s words. An intricate system of patronage was established that went all the way from generals and cabinet ministers down to neighbourhood informers and leaders of local Party branches, and distributed cash, goods, housing and plots of land. The effect of these rewards and enticements in creating and reinforcing loyalty can only have been enhanced by the fact that they could be revoked at merest suspicion of disloyalty. The system became so widespread and so complicated that the Party itself had trouble keeping track of it, and finding ways to meet the commitments it had made. These measures were all made more effective by the UN sanctions of the 1990s, as the shortages of food and other goods gave Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath extra leverage. Party members, for instance, were entitled to a higher food ration.
The most prestigious and most valuable of these rewards was a card that identified the holder as a “Friend of Saddam Hussein,” which entitled him or her to personal meetings with the president and other officials, gifts and property the same as that awarded to the president’s own employees, and a priority for themselves, their spouse and their children in entrance to universities and military academies, and, strangely, the gift of four suits a year directly from the president’s office. Closer to the other end of the scale was a Ba’ath Party badge, which entitled the holder to an apartment, which was particularly valued in Baghdad and Iraq’s other large cities, with their exorbitant real estate prices. Ba’athist military officers were awarded cars, or grants towards the cost of buying one.
Jobs were also within the Party’s gift. In academia, professors who were known Ba’athists favoured over those suspected of sympathising with other political credos. Senior members of the Republican Guard, the SSO, the president’s office, and the Ba’ath secretariat also enjoyed free access to university places, whatever their academic credentials (or lack thereof), all the way up to PhD level. Opportunities to study abroad were also often allocated on the basis of loyalty.
Outside of officialdom and the Party itself, the Ba’ath also made extensive use of informers amongst the general population, in common with all one-party dictatorships. While many people were motivated by money or threats, others seemed to have informed for personal reasons, such as to settle scores, or out of genuine conviction. Nonetheless, many received gifts of cars, cash, or housing, particularly those living in restive areas, such as the Kurdish north, and their relatives received pensions and other benefits if their activities on behalf of the regime led to them being killed.
In the end, Saddam Hussein skilfully deployed the power and resources available to him as the master of the state of Iraq. The Ba’ath Party was one of the most important instruments for dispensing the terror, violence and spoils that ensured the loyalty of his followers and the acceptance of the Iraqi people.
