In 2007, with security deteriorating by the day, the US military came up with a plan of courting Sunni tribal leaders to change the course of things. This became a crucial element in the counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq. Previously targeting civilians and US and Iraqi security forces, the Awakening Council (or Sons of Iraq), that comprise roughly 100,000 members, turned against al Qaeda and provided crucial intelligence about the organization’s members in Iraq. They also patrolled and secured several districts that were previously among the most problematic. More importantly, the “Sunni Awakening”, as the siding of Awakening Councils with the US and the Iraqi government came to be known, was decisive in breaking patterns of sectarian conflict.
Obviously, the Awakening Councils became the Iraqi government and the US’s most precious ally not because of an affinity that was nurtured or cultivated. The Sunni Iraqis were tired of al Qaeda’s indiscriminate attacks and, more importantly, the US and Maliki’s government made promises to the former Sunni militants. The short-term one was the payment of salaries. The longer term one was jobs and integration into the Shia-dominated security forces. Both have been largely unfulfilled.
The Awakening Councils accused the US and then the Iraqi government, to whom this responsibility was later transferred, of missing on the payments. A budget crisis of the Iraqi government in general and the Interior Ministry in particular is partly to blame. The Awakening Councils also claim that Maliki’s government is not doing everything within its reach to honour the promises of integrating them into the security forces. These claims are supported by developments such as the inclusion into the Iraqi security forces of 10,000 fighters from the militias aligned with two Shiite parties from the United Iraqi Alliance. Until now, only a small percentage of the Sons of Iraq have been integrated, at a rather slow pace, into the Iraqi security forces.
Another issue is likely to aggravate the situation. In general, the violence in Iraq has been decreasing steadily in the last year and a half, although some analysts disagree. As the report Iraq: Trends in Violence and Civilian Casualties of Anthony H. Cordesman, from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies shows, civilian casualties decreased steadily from the end of 2007/beginning of 2008, and registered further decrease in 2009. The suicide attacks in particular are now less frequent, but more surgical. They are aimed at government targets, but they are also directed at members of the Awakening Councils. These attacks of al Qaeda directed at the members of the Sunni awakening councils, and especially at its leaders, are more than just acts of vengeance. They are a clear strategy to explore sectarian rifts and a feeling of disappointment with the unfulfilled promises.
If there were any doubts about the need for all-inclusive politics in Iraq, it is now obvious that there will be no bright future if the return to sectarian loyalties is not prevented. The Sunni awakening members’ increasing discontent with their condition after assisting in the single most important mission of Iraq’s stabilization is worrying. If the needs of these groups—especially unemployment—are not addressed, this ticking bomb can explode when less expected. The risk is obvious. While the majority of the Awakening Councils is likely not to align with al Qaeda again, these thousands of unemployed and resentful former militants might undo the relative stability they helped building. This would mean a return to the pre-2007 situation, when there is no more room for such high profile mistakes.
Manuel Almeida
