Representatives from Iran, France, Russia, and the United States continue to negotiate the details of a possible arrangement, accepted in principle at the October 1 meeting in Geneva, whereby Iran would send approximately three-fourths of its current stocks of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia for further enrichment, from 3.5 percent to the 19.75 percent level required by Tehran’s medical research reactor. The newly enriched uranium would then go to France, where it would be converted into nuclear fuel cells, which are metal plates consisting of a uranium-aluminium alloy that could be used in the reactor.
For the past few months, the Iranian government has been seeking to import high-enriched uranium (HEU) nuclear fuel for its medical research reactor in Tehran. The 2,500 pounds of fuel Iran purchased from Argentina in 1993 will be exhausted in about a year. The reactor, built by the United States in the late 1960s, manufactures enough medical isotopes to detect and treat diseases, such as cancer and thyroid disorders, in approximately 10,000 people each week.
The Obama administration conceived of the medical enrichment deal. American officials feared that, without a foreign supplier of HEU, the Iranian government could cite its unmet medical requirements to justify developing its own means of enriching its thousands of pounds of LEU even further, perhaps to weapons grade (typically at least 80%). Russian officials readily agreed to this proposal, but they wanted another country to convert the enriched uranium into nuclear fuel cells. The Americans then secured France’s involvement as well as that of the IAEA.
During the past month, the negotiations with Iran have involved such issues as the amount of LEU Iran will transfer, the timing of the shipments, the costs of the conversion, and whether Iran must limit how much LEU it makes to replace the transferred and converted uranium.
Supporters of the deal describe it as a confidence-building measure that would demonstrate the ability of Iran and its negotiating partners to collaborate on a common goal. Although Russia already cooperates with Iran on nuclear matters, France does not. The arrangement would also give foreign observers additional insight into Iran’s nuclear activities. Finally, the conversion would help limit Iran’s growing stocks of LEU, which currently have no obvious civilian purpose given Iran’s lack of a nuclear power program.
Western critics of the deal worry that Iranian scientists and technicians could extract the HEU from its metal alloy, and then enrich it further to weapons-grade levels. They are also concerned that establishing such an arrangement would bestow de facto legitimization on Iran’s enrichment activities, which have repeatedly been prohibited by the U.N. Security Council, and thereby encourage other countries to pursue similar nuclear programs.
Iranians fear that Russia or France might keep the uranium rather than return it. They also worry that Israel might attack Iran’s nuclear sites after most of the Iranian LEU had left the country in order to impede Iran from replenishing its stocks.
This fear of further proliferation centers on Iran’s Arab neighbors. During the past few years, several Arab governments have announced that they are considering proposals to develop nuclear technologies for peaceful commercial purposes. These governments have affirmed that they would use nuclear power only for meeting their growing demands for electricity production, assisting with water desalination, and promoting agriculture. They also stress their desire to prepare for the day when their oil and gas supplies become exhausted. Some Arab representatives and commentators, however, have indicated that concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions have also prompted their desire to explore nuclear options. Certain Western analysts have viewed these statements as indications that the Middle East may soon experience a nuclear arms race, especially between Shiite Iran and conservative Sunni states.
Although accepting the legitimacy of Iran’s past nuclear enrichment may increase some countries’ interest in developing similar technologies, it is important not to overemphasize the scale of the Arab nuclear programs. Unlike Iran, they have not expressed any intent to pursue the most sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, such as uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, which could provide the basis for manufacturing nuclear weapons. Running such a national nuclear weapons program is very difficult and expensive. It has taken Iran decades to achieve a limited indigenous capacity for enriching uranium.
Fortunately, the Iranian deal can be expanded to discourage further nuclear enrichment activities. If the international arrangement for enriching uranium for Tehran’s medical reactor proves effective, then other countries would be encouraged to participate in similar multinational nuclear service mechanisms. For example, a nuclear fuel repository that would lend LEU fuel to countries having nuclear reactors. After using the fuel, the borrowers would then return the spent fuel to the original supplier. This process would allow them to pursue nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes without risking further nuclear proliferation through the spread of additional uranium enrichment facilities.
Richard Weitz - Ph.D. - Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis
Hudson Institute
