Supporters raise up posters depicting President Hassan Rouhani of Iran as his motorcade leaves Mehrabad Airport on September 28, 2013, in Tehran, Iran. (Majid Saeedi/Getty Images)[/caption]Since his election to the Iranian presidency in June, Hassan Rouhani has promised to reset Iranian diplomacy. He has assured us repeatedly that gone is the fractious and confrontational stance adopted by his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which saw negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) go nowhere for several frustrating years. So bad were relations between the two sides that they often seemed unable even to agree on what issues separated them, let alone make any progress on the question of Iran’s right to enrich uranium.
So last week’s nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 in Geneva were the first opportunity to see a Rouhani negotiating team in action. The substance of the talks is confidential for the time being, but we do know that Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who heads Iran’s nuclear negotiating team, presented an Iranian proposal (which, in keeping with the new spirit of accommodation, was in English) entitled "Closing an Unnecessary Crisis, and Opening a New Horizon" to the P5+1.
Bold words. Zarif described the talks as “extensive” and “fruitful,” while EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton called them the “most detailed” and most “substantive” ever held between the two sides. If not necessarily a “new horizon,” the positive rhetoric from both sides coming out Geneva was certainly novel.
Perhaps the most instructive development yet to emerge from the talks (given that their content remains confidential) is reaction to them in Iran. In an editorial titled “Why is the enemy satisfied?” the hardline Kayhan newspaper argued that the very fact that P5+1 diplomats seemed happy was cause for suspicion, claiming that “[t]he [P5+1’s] unprecedented excitement . . . shows that we have not gained any concessions in return for all the concessions that we have given away or promised to give away.”
Iranian politics can accurately—if simplistically—be described as an ongoing battle between “moderates” (the term is relative) and hardliners within the regime. Rouhani surely knows that every concession he makes will be seen as a sign of weakness for those in Tehran—many of whom are grouped around the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei—who argue that Iran’s best course of action is to continue onwards with its nuclear program. This school of thought argues that the West is in decline, as evidenced by the financial crisis, and that it does not have the capacity or stomach for effective military action, as evidenced by Iraq and Afghanistan.
Ahmadinejad was the leading exponent of this theory, which he believed was vindicated during his last few years in office. Throughout this time Iran continued onward with enrichment in defiance of international opposition, to reach the point where it has now enriched uranium to 20 percent and has significant stockpiles of low-enriched uranium (LEU), from which it could conceivably manufacture a nuclear bomb.
But Iran has also suffered as a result of these activities, which have triggered a host of oil and banking sanctions that are devastating its economy. Rouhani needs to alleviate at least some of the sanctions pressure on his country and the only way to do this is to show some flexibility on the nuclear issue.
Thus far, Rouhani has enjoyed support from the most important source—Khamenei. At Friday prayer sermons around the country (always a barometer of the official mood in Iran), prayer leaders, who take their cue from the Supreme Leader, almost universally praised the Geneva talks.
Reformist-minded newspapers like Bahar have also rushed to Rouhani’s defense, pointing out that any agreement reached between Iranian negotiators and the P5+1 would need Khamenei’s approval, so hardliner talk of “traitorous” behavior is both premature and absurd. For the time being, Rouhani has the political backing he needs and the support of the more liberal sections of Iranian society, not to mention of all those who voted for his platform of change.
But the situation remains dangerous, not least because Rouhani also faces intense external pressure, notably from Israel, which vows to keep “all options on the table” in its determination to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. For Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Iran’s civil nuclear program is merely a cover for a military program. As far as he is concerned, the (admittedly limited) progress between the two sides at Geneva has done little more than risk giving “legitimacy to a rogue regime that is participating in the massacre in Syria, is directing a global terror campaign, and calls for the destruction of Israel.”
Rouhani is likely to face intense pressure as talks continue, especially if (and it is by no means certain) Iran begins to show flexibility on some of the key issues in dispute. But his room to maneuver is small. He remains committed to the nuclear program and will not abandon enrichment, which will anger Israel and certain circles in Washington. If he does compromise, possibly by converting Iran’s stockpile of LEU into fuel rods, which would preclude their use in a bomb, Iranian hardliners will attack him mercilessly. Rouhani is caught between opposing forces, which he must be strong enough to resist. He must ensure negotiations succeed—for the sake of us all.
All views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, The Majalla magazine.
