Dissecting Turkey's Kurdish vote: Turnout, trends and alliances
Despite the surge in nationalist rhetoric toward the final stretch of campaigning, Kılıçdaroğlu won the majority in 12 out of 15 Kurdish-majority provinces, demonstrating the Kurds’ determination to oust Erdogan
Reuters
A man waits to cast his ballot during Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections in Diyarbakir, Turkey, May 14, 2023.
Dissecting Turkey's Kurdish vote: Turnout, trends and alliances
According to the final results of the second round of the Turkish presidential elections, the general trend of Kurdish electoral behaviour remained consistent in both south-eastern Turkey, where the Kurdish majority resides, and central cities with significant Kurdish populations.
The majority of Kurds followed traditional voting patterns and aligned with the Democratic Party of the Peoples, also known as the Pro-Kurdish party, which garnered about two-thirds of the total votes.
However, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party still maintained influence among Kurdish populations, particularly among conservative segments.
People line up to vote at a polling station during the second round of the presidential election in Diyarbakir, Turkey May 28, 2023.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party still maintained influence among Kurdish populations, particularly among conservative segments.
The Kurdish population constitutes an absolute majority in 15 south-eastern provinces of Turkey, which are located along the country's borders with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Additionally, there are substantial Kurdish neighbourhoods and populations in central cities such as Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin, and Adana.
While there are no official statistics on the size of the Kurdish voting bloc or its proportion of the total voters in Turkey, estimations can provide some insights.
Combining the total votes obtained by the Green Left Party, the representative of the Kurdish nationalist movement, in the previous parliamentary elections (approximately 5 million votes), along with nearly half of those votes going to the Justice and Development Party and its allied parties in Kurdish-majority areas, and factoring in a similar number of people who abstained from voting, it can be inferred that the Kurdish voting bloc comprises approximately 10 million votes out of a total of 64 million votes, constituting approximately 15.6 percent of the total voters.
People line up to vote at a polling station during the second round of the presidential election in Diyarbakir, Turkey May 28, 2023.
Decisive support for the opposition
According to the detailed results, the opposition candidate, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, received 5.6 million Kurdish votes out of a total of 25.4 million votes he obtained.
This indicates that approximately 20 percent of the opposition candidate's votes came from the Kurdish community thanks to the support he received from the Democratic Party of the Peoples and the Green Left Party, which represent Kurdish nationalist aspirations.
Erdogan, on the other hand, received nearly half of those votes from Kurdish-majority areas and central Kurdish cities.
However, it is worth noting that the percentage maintained by Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party in the Kurdish community was enough to secure his victory in the elections.
For example, in the south-eastern province of Urfa, where there is an absolute Kurdish majority, Erdogan received 610,000 votes compared to the opposition candidate's 330,000 votes. These votes constitute approximately 25 percent of the total vote difference of 2.6 million votes between the competing candidates.
A voter arrives to cast his ballot during the presidential runoff vote in Diyarbakir, on May 28, 2023.
Among the 15 Kurdish-majority provinces, the opposition candidate won the majority in 12 of them, with the majority in most of these provinces exceeding 70 percent. In the Kurdish province of Tunceli (Dersim), the majority reached a record 82.9 percent.
Among the 15 Kurdish-majority provinces, the opposition candidate won the majority in 12 of them, with the majority in most of these provinces exceeding 70 percent.
Erdogan, on the other hand, won the majority in only three Kurdish-majority provinces: Urfa, Adıyaman, and Bingöl.
Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan (C) and his party's allies greet his supporters following his victory in the second round of the presidential election at the Presidential Palace in Ankara, on May 29, 2023.
The political and cultural centres of the Kurdish region in Turkey voted in favour of the opposition candidate. In the provinces of Diyarbakır, Van, and Mardin, the Kurdish voting bloc remained aligned with the Kurdish parties.
In Diyarbakır, the opposition candidate received 71.6 percent of the total votes, while in Van it was 61.5 percent, and in Mardin it was 65.2 percent. These urban and civic centres have consistently been targeted by Erdogan, who has threatened the Kurdish parties with political and electoral exclusion.
Despite his efforts — including forming an alliance with the Free Call Party, the political wing of the Kurdish Hezbollah party accused of committing numerous crimes against civilians in the 1990s, and allocating substantial resources to benefit businessmen and opinion leaders close to him, particularly religious figures and tribal leaders in rural areas of those provinces — he failed to achieve his goal.
The majority of the social bases in those areas continued to vote in favour of the Kurdish parties.
The major cities with large Kurdish communities, including Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, and Mersin, have historically been dominated by Islamist political forces for the past 30 years (except for Izmir).
However, in recent times, these cities have witnessed a shift in voting behaviour, with the majority of votes now going to the opposition candidate due to the electoral influence of the Kurdish communities residing within them.
The major cities with large Kurdish communities have historically been dominated by Islamist political forces for the past 30 years. However, in recent times, these cities have witnessed a shift in voting behaviour due to the electoral influence of the Kurdish communities residing within them.
This shift reflects the guidance and direction provided by the Kurdish parties.
It is worth noting that despite the opposition forces suffering a "defeat" in the recent parliamentary elections, the Kurdish social and popular bases demonstrated a high level of participation in the second round of the presidential elections, defying expectations.
Observers attribute the high participation rates in various Kurdish-majority provinces — marked by a 75 percent and above voter turnout — to the persistent civic engagement efforts of the Kurdish parties. Their aim was to bring about a change in the presidential elections following their loss in the parliamentary elections.
Partisan tensions
During the election campaign, tensions arose between the Republican People's Party, which represents Atatürkist ideas and nationalist Turkish aspirations, along with several Turkish nationalist opposition parties, and the parties representing Kurdish nationalist aspirations.
However, the end result shows that this political, psychological, and ideological gap has been partially bridged.
The Kurds remained committed to supporting the opposition candidate, despite not receiving clear commitments to address their national issue in Turkey, except for some minor details such as the release of political prisoners and discussions on the Kurdish issue within the parliamentary arena.
The Kurds remained committed to supporting the opposition candidate, despite not receiving clear commitments to address their national issue.
Similarly, the Kurdish parties maintained their commitments despite tensions that arose a few days before the second round of the presidential elections between the Democratic Party of the Peoples and the Green Left Party (Kurdish) on one side, and the Republican People's Party and the opposition candidate, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, on the other.
Polling station officials wait with the bags containing ballots outside the office of Supreme Electoral Board, in Diyarbakir, Turkey, Sunday, May 28, 2023.
These tensions stemmed from Kılıçdaroğlu's strong nationalist discourse in the preceding weeks, as well as his explicit alliance with the extreme nationalist Victory Party (ZP) and receiving support from its leader, Oğuzhan Asiltürk.
Following the incident and tensions between the Kurdish parties and the opposition candidate, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the political bureaus of the Kurdish parties released a joint statement expressing concern over the emergence of discourses that go against democratic values and principles.
They indicated that they would clarify their final position regarding the side they would support in the second round of the elections after a few days.
During this period, there were intensive communications between leaders of the Republican People's Party and the leadership of the Democratic Party of the Peoples, as revealed by a high-ranking source in the Democratic Party's leadership to Al Majalla.
The Republican People's Party explained their motives for communicating and reaching an agreement with the Victory Party and Oğuzhan Asiltürk, especially after the third candidate in the first round of the presidential elections, Sinan Oğan, declared his support for Erdogan.
Polling station officials wait with the bags containing ballots outside the office of Supreme Electoral Board, in Diyarbakir, Turkey, Sunday, May 28, 2023.
Eventually, the Democratic Party of the Peoples and the Green Left Party returned and announced their support for the opposition candidate, urging the Kurdish social and popular bases to vote for Kılıçdaroğlu and participate intensively.
The two parties launched a campaign promoting and advocating for the opposition candidate, which was appreciated by the Republican People's Party leadership and many members of the Turkish cultural, intellectual, and political elite. Their commitment to their alliances despite the challenges was recognised and praised.
Future alliances
Looking ahead, with the narrowing of the popular support gap between the opposition forces and the ruling alliance to less than 3 percent, the political map in Turkey is divided into two distinct geographic/popular blocs.
The opposition bloc encompasses coastal regions in the south and west of the country, including the capital Ankara, as well as the provinces with a Kurdish majority in the southeast. Meanwhile, the bloc supporting Erdogan is concentrated in central Anatolia and the Black Sea coastal areas.
In the coming year, at least three major events are expected to take place, during which the Turkish opposition forces, led by the Republican People's Party and the extreme nationalist Good Party, will explore ways to create a consensus with political and popular forces representing the Kurds.
The aim is to work together and exert political and popular pressure on the government and President Erdogan.
In the coming year, at least three major events are expected to take place, during which the Turkish opposition forces will explore ways to create a consensus with political and popular forces representing the Kurds with the aim of exerting popular pressure on Erdogan's government.
In the upcoming municipal elections, it would be advantageous for the opposition forces to once again seek Kurdish votes in major cities to strengthen their position as a significant political force in the country.
However, Kurdish support would likely be contingent upon the Kurdish parties demanding further recognition and discourse on the Kurdish issue from the opposition.
They would also apply joint pressure to end the government's persistent behaviour of removing Kurdish mayors from office under the pretext of "supporting terrorism."
A man waits to cast his ballot during Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections in Diyarbakir, Turkey, May 14, 2023.
Furthermore, an economic crisis is anticipated in Turkey, with experts describing the country's economic trajectory as "stifled." The recent 5 percent devaluation of the Turkish lira is seen as a significant indicator of this crisis.
The economic shock will likely prompt the opposition to confront the government through street protests and demand early parliamentary elections. Addressing this issue will require cooperation between the parliamentary and political factions of the opposition, as well as garnering popular support.
Additionally, the issue of refugees — particularly Syrian refugees — will intensify political, economic, and popular debates within Turkey in the near future.
The opposition forces will heavily utilise this issue against the government, considering it as a direct cause of their electoral defeat and the overall deterioration of the country's situation.
To avoid being accused of nationalist and sectarian extremism against refugees, the opposition will require support from Kurdish forces.
Overall, these three issues — further recognition of the Kurdish issue, the economic crisis, and the refugee situation — will shape the dynamics between the opposition forces and the government in Turkey, necessitating cooperation, joint pressure, and support from the Kurdish parties to strengthen the opposition's position and effectively challenge the ruling alliance.
