by Dennis Ross*
There is much speculation in Washington about the impact that Mike Pompeo and John Bolton, the new Secretary of State and National Security Advisor will have on the foreign policy of the Trump administration. Both are seen as “hawks” on North Korea and Iran.
Those who believe that their appointments herald a tougher approach seem to assume that the policies to date were not the ones that President Trump wanted. Tweets about “rocket man,” “maximum pressure”, and now a summit with Kim Jong un, North Korea’s leader, all very much reflect the president. Moreover, the White House’s announcement of the summit with Kim came as a surprise to Tillerson who was saying even the day before that we weren’t close to talks.
Perhaps, it is a different story on Iran. First, the president acknowledged that he and the former Secretary, Rex Tillerson, did not see eye to eye on Iran. Ironically, it was Tillerson in a speech on Syria who made the point that countering Iran there was one of the pillars of our policy. And, yet when General Votel, the head of Central Command, was testifying on Capitol Hill, he said his mission in Syria was only to defeat ISIS. When specifically asked about whether countering Iran in Syria was part of the mission, he explicitly stated it was not. Shortly after that, President Trump, when asked by the press in an appearance with Australia’s prime minister, Malcolm Turnbull, about our mission in Syria, stated bluntly that it was ISIS, only ISIS.
Was that the difference Trump was referring to with Tillerson? Probably not—it was on the nuclear deal, the JCPOA, where their real differences appeared to manifest themselves. Trump, after all, hates the deal and clearly would like to walk away from it. For his part, Tillerson, along with Secretary of Defense Mattis, has preferred to stay in the deal—seeing it as flawed but better than the alternative and understanding departing the JCPOA was bound to drive a wedge between us and our European allies. With both Pompeo and Bolton being strong critics of the JCPOA, it certainly appears that the president may be poised in May to re-impose the sanctions and leave the deal.
Here there is another irony: the greatest threat the Iranians pose today is not with their nuclear weapons program which has been deferred. Whatever the flaws in the JCPOA—and there are many—it has bought time. Iran is limited until the year 2030 on the numbers and types of centrifuges it can have. Similarly, until 2030, it cannot possess more than 300 kilograms of enriched uranium—which is itself less than one bomb’s worth of material and the 300 kilograms cannot be enriched or purified above 3.5 percent. (Weapons grade fissile material is enriched to 80-90%.)
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN’s watchdog for monitoring Iran’s compliance with its obligations in the JCPOA, the Islamic Republic is living up to the requirements of the deal and is not in violation of its provisions. Does that mean Iran is not violating UN Security Council resolutions? No, it is; look no further than Yemen where Iran is in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2216—a resolution designed to stop the foreign funneling of weapons to the Houthis. Houthis have just fired seven rockets in one day against Riyadh. The rockets and their parts come from the Iranians with Hezbollah helping assemble and train the Houthis on these weapons. In addition, UN Security Council resolution 2231, the resolution that replaced the sanctions resolutions on Iran after the JCPOA was completed, prohibited the transfer of Iranian conventional weaponry to others in the region.
Certainly, the Trump administration should be leading an effort given these UN Security Council resolutions to interdict and stop the shipment of these arms. Here the real threat that Iran poses comes into focus; it is what Iran is doing in the region now—not what its nuclear program may threaten in 2030. This is not to say that the nuclear issue should be ignored, but the greatest threat we and our allies and partners presently face from Iran is its expansion throughout the Middle East. The Qods Forces, the action arm of the Revolutionary Guard, trains, arms, finances, and often times leads Shia militias as they exploit local conflicts and make them worse, gain leverage over neighboring states, and de-stabilize those regimes not controlled or heavily influenced by the Iranians.
Will Pompeo and Bolton make it more likely that the administration will act, at least, to contain the Iranians and blunt their continuing expansion? That has not been the policy in Syria. Maybe they will persuade the president to change it.
One last irony: if the administration wants to enhance deterrence of the Iranians so they will not even be tempted to go for a nuclear weapon after 2030 when their large nuclear infrastructure will make them a nuclear threshold state and give them that option, the Iranians must have no doubt about the price that would be paid for doing so. Walking away from the JCPOA now, at a time when the Europeans will not walk with us but will offer the Iranians incentives to stay in the deal, will not send that message. It will isolate the United States not Iran. However, acting to contain the Iranians in the region now will send the message that bad behaviors will cost the Iranians. It can get Iranian leaders over time sensitive to the dangers of crossing thresholds, and the risk of American responses, including military ones, if the Iranians should ever think of trying to present the world with a nuclear weapons fait accompli.
*American Middle East envoy Dennis Ross has served in the Administrations of Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama, and is counselor and Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in Washington.
