Russian police officers detain a participant of an unauthorized opposition rally in Saint Petersburg on June 12, 2017.Over 200 people were detained on June 12, 2017 by police at opposition protests called by Kremlin critic Alexei Navalny, said a Russian NGO tracking arrests. "About 121 people were detained in Moscow up to this point. In Saint-Petersburg - 137," OVD-Info group, which operates a detention hotline, wrote on Twitter. / AFP PHOTO / OLGA MALTSEVA (Photo credit should read OLGA MALTSEVA/AFP/Getty Images)[/caption]
Putin Fears the New Generation of Protesters
by Maia Otarashvii*
Until recently, young Russian citizens have been known for their support for Vladimir Putin and their lack of interest in politics. That picture seems to be changing in light of the recent anti-corruption protest movements in Russia, albeit slowly.
“I don’t have bad days, I am not a woman,” said Vladimir Putin to Hollywood director Oliver Stone when he was asked in an interview whether or not he “loses it” sometimes after a bad day. Putin may not admit it, but one Russian opposition leader—Alexey Navalny, and his young followers—has been responsible for ruining more than just one day for the Russian president lately. This is evident from the repeated arrests of the controversial young politician. Back in March, Navalny-organized anti-corruption protests ended with over 1,000 protesters, including Navalny, in jail. He was released from prison on April 15. Less than two months after he was released, Navalny organized another protest in Moscow on June 12, which lasted only two hours before the police arrested approximately 1,500 people, landing Navalny in prison again. Now, for the latest anti-corruption protest on June 12, Navalny was detained as he was leaving his home in the morning to go and lead the protests. His wife’s twitter post relayed Navalny’s message to the protesters: “Alexei has been detained in the entrance to his home. He said to pass on that plans haven’t changed: Tverskaya [street].” Navalny is expected to spend another 15 days in jail.
The June wave of anti-corruption protests, much like the one in March, were inspired by Navalny’s recent documentary exposing the corruption within the Russian government and Putin’s inner circle. This particular documentary primarily targeted Prime Minister Medvedev, exposing and ridiculing his tremendous wealth. At both protests people were tossing around yellow toy ducks, symbolizing Medvedev’s luxury house allegedly dedicated to raising ducks.
SMALL MOVEMENT, MAJOR NEW TRENDS
Despite the excitement surrounding the protests, it is important to put these events in the larger context of current Russian public opinion data. A Levada Center poll in May found that if the election were held right away instead of 2018, 63 percent of Russians would vote for Putin, while just 2 percent would vote for Navalny. Moreover, President Putin’s approval ratings remain steady just above 80 percent. So, why is the Kremlin so alarmed by these protests so much so that he detains protesters by the hundreds?
There are two major factors that make these anti-corruption protests unique: first, the movement, unlike the previous ones, is prevalent throughout Russia. Protests took place in almost 150 cities across the country; they have spread to the regions where the base of Putin’s supporters reside. Second, Navalny’s followers tend to be very young; according to arrest reports, 136 of the over 800 individuals detained in March were 18 years old or younger. According to The Economist data, Navalny’s movement has 120,000 volunteers in Russia. 150,000 individuals came out during the June 12 protests, and 100,000 people participated in the March protests. About half of the protesters are reportedly between 18 and 29 years old.
At one glance, it seems that politically active young people may be plotting the end of Putin’s regime in Russia. But the story of Russian youth and their civic participation is much more complex. At least up to this point, young Russians could be characterized as either politically uninterested, or as supportive of Putin. Public opinion polls show that only a third of young Russians are interested in politics: in the 18-22 age group, those who are not interested in politics make up 64 percent of the group. Among Russians aged between 28 and 30 years, about 55 percent do not follow politics. Moreover, willingness to protest among young people as a whole does not exceed 10 percent at the moment. Voting trends show that young Russians do not vote either. In the 2016 parliamentary elections, 30 percent voted in the youngest age group—this number is very low compared to the 50 percent overall voter participation in the general population, and 70 percent in the oldest age group.
THE KREMLIN’S NEW CHALLENGE
These statistics support Kremlin apologists’ claims that age was not the determining value in terms of Russian opposition forces. This popular opinion argues that young people support the government not so much because of the government propaganda, but because it has less reason to question the status quo. Those who are dissatisfied in Russia are supposed to be found in two different groups of the population: among the neediest ("who has not won anything") and among the most knowledgeable ("who knows and understands everything"). These categories supposedly transcend age.
However, the recent anti-corruption protests show that these trends may be changing; a certain segment of the young Russians is becoming increasingly politically active. A new popular opinion about Russian youth is taking hold; it argues that “The [Putin] regime is built on two bulwarks: faux opposition to lend legitimacy to the political process, and state television to spin the news in the Kremlin’s favor. These are both crumbling with age, as Navalny has revealed this spring.” The role of the latter, the state television, is said to be one of the decisive factors in the increasing number of young protesters—young Russians do not watch the television like their parents do, they spend more time online, where not every piece of information is curated by the Russian state-owned media, hence the rising dissent among the Russian youth.
[caption id="attachment_55253917" align="aligncenter" width="1024"]
MOSCOW, RUSSIA - MARCH 26: A protester holds a yellow duck toy, a new symbol of corruption during anti-corruption demonstrations on March 26, 2017 in Moscow, Russia. Thousands of people crowded for an unsanctioned protest against Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev after reports by Russia's opposition leader Alexei Navalny's group claiming that Medvedev has amassed a collection of mansions, yachts and vineyards, and also a house for raising ducks. (Photo by Alexander Miridonov/Kommersant via Getty Images)[/caption]
It is unclear how this young opposition movement will evolve—it is still too early to tell. However, the Kremlin seems alarmed and is reacting with force and disinformation. Alongside the arrests, the Kremlin has launched an anti-Navalny propaganda campaign, which compares him to Hitler. Kremlin apologists argue that the West is blowing the anti-corruption movements out of proportion. For example, a recent Russia Today article criticized the Western media’s coverage of the uprisings, claiming that “there are two Russias. The one 145-odd million people live in and the version presented in the Anglophone press. But rarely has the divide between hack hyperbole and reality been as chasmic as seen in the coverage of this week’s rallies. Not to mention how the publicity granted to their organizer has been consistently over the top.” Perhaps, this analysis is correct in some sense; perhaps, there really are two Russias, but not because one is real and the other is a figment of Western imagination, but because one is pro- and the other is increasingly anti-Putin-regime.
Every time President Putin comments on developments at home or abroad, the notion of alternative realities (when international affairs is discussed), or on this case, of two Russias, resurfaces. After mostly ignoring the protest movements, Putin told the press that the protests were pre-election PR and nothing more (the 2018 Russian presidential elections are just around the corner, and both, Navalny and Putin, will very likely run for president).
“I am ready to engage with anyone who is genuinely interested in making people’s lives better, in solving the pressing issues our country is facing, and not using those issues to generate political PR for themselves. … Avoid cashing in on problems, offer solutions. Those who do deserve attention can expect an honest dialogue with the authorities. That’s the way we do things.”
Putin has been staying away from mentioning Navalny by name, but this statement was certainly directed at him.
“THESE VIOLENT DELIGHTS [MAY] HAVE VIOLENT ENDS”
After the March protests, a prominent Russian political analyst and Putin’s former speech-writer Abbas Gallyamov offered some advice to the leaders of this young anti-regime movement. Gallyamov argued that this movement for change is a marathon—not a sprint—thus the protesters should treat it as a long-term project: one that will focus on the gradual change of culture. Moreover, Gallyamov advised Navalny and his supporters to target the regime and its malice as their enemy, and not to focus on individual leaders like Putin and Medvedev as the culprits. That way, the current elites will be more likely to go along with change eventually, and even help facilitate it.
“If they can put up with the regime until 2024, then no revolution will be required: whoever ends up becoming Putin’s successor, that person will begin democratic reforms. But for this to happen, the opposition must effectively discredit not necessarily Putin or Medvedev personally, but the characteristics of the regime: the authoritarian practices of the government disguised as ideas of traditionalism, the ‘iron fist,’ the thug-like approach to politics, and the general attitude of resentment towards the rest of the world as a whole.”
But patience and backing of gradualism aren’t exactly standard characteristics of young people anywhere in the world, and it looks like the Russian protesters aren’t willing to wait until 2024, as Gallyamov suggests, to see real regime change happen in Russia. All signs point to the likelihood of these anti-corruption protests continuing.
So far Kremlin has been quite light-handed in its punishment of the Navalny-led movement. Fifteen days in prison, coupled with some “light” pushing and shoving of the protesters, is nothing compared to the brutal violence anti-Kremlin movements have had to face in the past. It is important to keep in mind that Putin’s most credible rival, Boris Nemtsov, was murdered in Moscow in 2015. His murder is still shrouded in mystery and is believed to have been ordered by the Kremlin. Nemtsov is just one among the dozens of dead Putin critics in the “trail of dead Russians.”
As the Kremlin gears up for the 2018 presidential elections, it may be unwilling to risk letting the anti-corruption protest movement to keep growing. Every time there are uprisings in the Eurasia region, the Kremlin starts building up paranoia, pointing fingers at the West, claiming that Europeans and Americans are fabricating regime change in places like Ukraine back in 2014. Putin has already begun blaming the West for supporting Navalny. During a press conference, he told a British reporter who asked about Navalny: “When I heard you were from the BBC, I didn’t doubt for a moment you would ask precisely that question because it’s in certain sense propaganda of the people whom you support.” If Putin truly starts to feel threatened, despite the relatively small size of the “threat” that these protests actually pose to his rule, and decides that the West is behind these movements, this story may have a violent end.
*Maia Otarashvili is Research Fellow and Program Manager of the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. She holds an MA in Globalization, Development, and Transitions from the University of Westminster in London, UK. Her current research is focused on the post-communist countries of the Eurasia region, including the Black Sea and Caucasus states.
