An Iraqi man reads a local newspaper the day after results revealed that Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki won the most seats in parliamentary elections. (Ahmad Al-Rubaye/AFP/Getty Images)[/caption]
Elections in Iraq have become a test of acquiring and maintaining power rather than a national debate as to how power could or should be exercised in the best interests of the country.
The three skills most required of a politician in the “new Iraq” are, first, they have to win the support of their ethnic or sectarian community and then mobilize that base to “get out the vote” on election day. Second, they have to then successfully navigate the lengthy bartering period following the election (it took nearly ten months after the last election in 2010) to secure a ministry, government post or some other form of patronage as part of a coalition agreement. Third—and perhaps a distant third in terms of priority and competency—they need to finally get on with the efficient running of the country, while of course keeping their eyes fixed on the next election cycle ahead.
Veteran Iraq commentator Professor Juan Cole’s analysis of the recent election was that “everybody lost,” as sectarian politics virtually guarantee that “there will be another hung parliament that gets almost nothing done.” Not dissimilar to Lebanon, there is in Iraq a de facto agreement among communities that the prime minister will be a Shi'ite Arab, the president a Kurd and the parliament speaker a Sunni Arab. The theory was that “unity” governments would force compromise and pragmatism through the politics of institutions, rather than violence. However, to date, the actors that perform on this stage have had personal and community gain as their clear priority.
The elections have also become more of a technical exercise concerned with showing the outside world that the state is still functioning, rather than an opportunity for real policy debate or ideological narrative. The practical administration of elections, however, has been more or less successful. Despite the worst level of violence for years that has seen more than 4,000 killed so far in 2014—with seventy-four people killed in one day, May 28, the bloodiest single day in seven months—electoral officials reported that 62 percent of the 22 million eligible voters were able to cast ballots, and violence was largely contained. Incumbent Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki has looked to channel Iraq’s epidemic of car bombs and marketplace massacres into a narrative that places him in the classic role of the bulwark against terrorism. Following the elections, Maliki even called for “jihad” against (ISIS), which is fighting against government forces in Iraq’s western province of Anbar.
Maliki’s “strong-man tactics” appear to have resulted in success at the polls. Preliminary results showed his State of Law coalition in the lead with a combined total of ninety-two out of 328 seats—up from eighty-nine in 2010 and three times as many as his nearest rivals, but some way from the 165 required to form a majority government. Maliki also surpassed his personal vote count of 622,000 in 2010, collecting 727,000 votes this time. But he will still need to work with other parties to form a majority in parliament.
Ranj Alaaldin, a doctoral researcher focusing on Shi'ites in Iraq at the London School of Economics told The Majalla it was still unclear what kind of coalition might emerge from the elections. “The most likely scenario is yet another national unity coalition government,” he said. “Save for Maliki’s State of Law coalition, there is not that much separating other parties and blocs.”
Alaaldin said security had deteriorated so much in Iraq that the country’s ruling elite would prefer to have all sides represented in government, particularly as a result of the ongoing sectarian conflict in the country. “In other words, if Sunni parties end up in opposition, then that could exacerbate existing tensions and perceptions among Iraq’s Sunnis that they are being marginalized, which will boost Iraq’s resurgent Sunni Arab militants and Islamists,” he said.
Maliki’s two main Shi'ite political rivals, Ammar Al-Hakim's Al-Muwatin bloc and the Al-Ahrar bloc loyal to Moqtada Al-Sadr, only won a combined fifty-seven seats. Iraq scholar Reidar Visser crunched the stats and suggested that “with numbers like this, Maliki is likely to try hard to form some kind of majority government before considering other alternatives.” The National Alliance, an umbrella body that encompasses the country’s leading Shi'a parties, said at the start of June it was surprised that Maliki’s partner coalition had unilaterally nominated him for a third term, and urged the nomination be withdrawn.
Indeed several opposition blocs have stated that they draw a “red line” at Maliki gaining a third term as prime minister. The Kurds, who secured sixty-two seats, even threatened a referendum on independence if Maliki gets the nod. However, as with any good negotiations, things are likely to change drastically, with a general consensus that Maliki will emerge with the third term he craves.
Meanwhile, the Sunnis appear to have been largely abandoned. The Anbar Awakening, also known as the Sons of Iraq, have become orphans in the eyes of the government, which appears to have surrendered them to Al-Qaeda and the spillover from the conflict in Syria. There was no voting in a third of the western province of Anbar, where Sunni tribesmen and militants linked to ISIS still control the city of Fallujah and parts of Ramadi, despite the government's attempts to dislodge them over the last six months.
Unsurprisingly, some Sunni religious leaders declared the elections illegitimate, as many Sunnis were displaced by fighting or are living in areas where it was too dangerous to vote. Only one major party even attempted to win votes nationwide, yet ex-premier Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiya List finished with just twenty-one seats.
The collapse of the Iraqiya List and the wider Sunni marginalization has almost certainly made it harder for the leaders of the National Alliance to defend the strategic purpose of a united Shi'a list. This, in turn, has made the “red line” around Maliki’s nomination harder to police and explains the confidence with which the incumbent prime minister is playing his hand. The key question remains therefore whether Maliki’s ‘divide and rule’ strategy is as robust as it looks or whether opposition to his third term can bring together enough factions from across the political spectrum that are solely motivated by blocking his path to the premiership.
The state’s powers of patronage are growing as political divisions and violence increase. We shouldn’t forget that behind the images of devastated marketplaces and wailing ambulances is a country with the fifth-largest oil reserves on the planet and whose foreign currency reserves rose 33 percent to 88 billion US dollars in the fourth quarter from the end of 2012. An impasse over revenue-sharing between the government and Iraq’s self-ruling Kurds is among the disputes that have blocked approval of a record budget of 145.9 billion for 2014, with Maliki regularly flagging populist pet projects such as the building of a monorail and purchasing high-tech military hardware.
The international community has repeatedly warned that if Iraq cannot reconcile its ethnic and sectarian differences, the country could fracture and exacerbate regional tensions. Alaaldin believes “it will come down to the nature of the government that emerges and whether it can function and give the country a sense of direction, in terms of the policies it comes up with and the implementation of those policies.” How much Iraq’s new politicians heed this advice is debatable, to say the least, and despite all the energy and focus that an election provides, it is likely to be business as usual for the country, with Maliki back in power for another term.
