A Stark Reality for Libya’s Progress

A Stark Reality for Libya’s Progress

[caption id="attachment_55248263" align="alignnone" width="620"]Clashes between Libyan security forces and armed groups near Tripoli, Libya on January 21, 2014. (Hazem Turkia/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images) Clashes between Libyan security forces and armed groups near Tripoli, Libya on January 21, 2014. (Hazem Turkia/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)[/caption]

This week, in Tunisia, the country's National Assembly passed a new constitution providing a clear benchmark for the progress of a democratic transition in the wake of the 2011 uprising. While it is too early to determine the success of this transition, the progressive agenda of the new constitution indicates an auspicious outcome for the North African country. This watershed moment, however, throws the rest of the region into stark relief—particularly neighboring Libya, where growing unrest since the 2011 uprisings has created an ambiguous outcome.

Shortly after the overthrow of the administration of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya’s new leaders worked quickly to hold elections for the General National Congress (GNC) and to begin the new constitution-drafting process. The interim constitution outlined a process by which a constituent commission of 60 members would devise and write the new document. In the absence of a constitution many of the laws put in place by the Gaddafi government continue to be enforced, including parts of the penal code that restricted freedom of expression. These laws were used to target critics of the new administration, including Moad Al-Hnesh, a Libyan engineer who opposed Western intervention in Libya, and Jamal Al-Hajji, a writer who accused high-placed Libyan politicians of corruption. Progress on the constitution, however, has since been hampered by a largely ineffective congress, and regionalist strife and violence throughout the country.

Groups in the south of Libya, as well as Amazigh and federalist groups in the east of Libya, representing a region referred to as Brega or Cyrenaica, continue to agitate for greater representation and power within the new administration. These regionalist divisions have delayed the drafting of the new constitution—Amazigh leaders, for example, have been lobbying for the recognition of the Amazigh language and identity within the constitutional articles. Furthermore, the constitutional law reserves only two seats for Amazigh representatives on the commission. This significant oversight has inspired calls from Amazigh leaders to boycott the commission entirely.

Meanwhile, federalist leaders in the east have sabotaged the oil ports and created an independent government to govern Cyrenaica. They are demanding that the new constitution recognizes their right to a certain degree of autonomy under the new government. The distribution of natural resources is a particular sticking point. Cyrenaica leaders are pushing GNC leaders to form a committee for the regulation of oil exports from the Cyrenaica region.

Both of these groups—the Amazigh and the Cyrenaica federalists—were subject to political marginalization under the Gaddafi government; their actions over the past two years have been part of efforts to prevent those disparities in power reproducing themselves within the new government. It is difficult to say, however, whether their organizing and activism has been effective.

Additionally, there have been worries that a constitutional law, which sets aside 10 percent of the commission seats for women, does not do enough to mitigate the historical inequalities that have excluded women from the political process in Libya.

Many of the militias formed to fight in the 2011 revolution maintain autonomy from the government, and efforts to absorb them into a national force have failed. The large-scale circulation of weapons throughout the country has led to a sharp increase in crime. According to a report released by a GNC committee this month, 643 people were killed in Libya in the past year alone. Many of the murders and kidnappings, perpetrated by militias or “masked gunmen,” have gone unsolved in the absence of an organized police force.

Were the GNC capable of organizing an effective police force, however, it would have a difficult time enforcing any of the laws. The GNC and all its affiliated institutions lose legitimacy every day they operate without a democratic constitution.

All views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, The Majalla magazine.

font change