Egypt constitutional committee members read documents during the voting for Egypt's draft constitution on November 30, 2013. (Stringer/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)[/caption]
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is in a rut. Languishing in illegality with its funds frozen, it faces entrenched hostility from both the army-backed interim government and its revolutionary opponents. In other words, even its enemy's enemies are not its friends. The latest episode in the Brotherhood's narrative of woe is the sentencing of twenty-one female Mursi supporters to lengthy prison sentences for protesting the president's removal. A number of those sentenced are minors.
However, the Brotherhood is far from undone, and with the coming of the 2013 Constitution, and the heightening tension between the interim government and its opponents, the group faces new strategic choices.
In the background to the group's current plight, Egypt's constitutional process has arrived at a significant moment. On Saturday night, the Committee of Fifty (C50) voted on the first 138 articles of the new constitution. A referendum on the draft is likely in late December.
Broadly, the C50 voted on the draft without much internal controversy and the majority of articles were agreed with a sweeping majority. Tellingly, Article 7, which relieves Al-Azhar of the duty of being consulted on matters relating to Islamic law, and allows the Supreme Constitutional Court to once again apply its liberal and idiosyncratic interpretations in such matters, proved one of the more controversial articles.
These duties and powers were at the heart of the conflict between Islamist and non-Islamist forces since the 2011 Revolution and will likely provoke a great degree of controversy once more. It is the reappearance of the question of the role of religion in the state by the constitutional process that poses new strategic choices for the beleaguered Brotherhood.
The Brotherhood seems unlikely to abandon its boycott strategy by going to the polls in late December to vote down the constitution, but whether it attacks the constitution by boycott or by participation, it will have to make a choice over whether it attacks the constitution from a predominantly Islamist or secular position.
Currently, the Brotherhood bases its leadership of the anti-coup—or shara'iyya (“legitimacy”)—campaign on the democratic legitimacy of the deposed president. This more "secular" position is designed to garner the support of Islamist and non-Islamist causes alike.
In the face of the new constitution, the Brotherhood could continue with this line—by emphasizing what they see as the illegitimacy of the C50 as usurpers of a democratic regime. Or, in light of the 2013 Constitution's reversal of the Islamist constitutional gains of 2012, the Brotherhood could oppose the C50's draft on the grounds of the constitution's secularizing tendencies. Both of these options offer inroads into expanded support for the Brotherhood, and perhaps a chance to move out of its political isolation.
The current more "secular" strategy, which the Brotherhood adopted with the removal of Mursi in July, has had some, if limited, success in attracting non-Islamists, but it did not attract the Brotherhood's largest ideological, if not political, ally—the Salafist Nour Party.
Opposing the 2013 Constitution on its secularizing tendencies may gain the Brotherhood wider Islamist support, especially in light of the Nour party's significant role in establishing the very clauses that the 2013 Constitution is likely to revoke.
While there are strong signs that the Nour party will endorse the 2013 Constitution in a continuation of its notorious realpolitik (its president, Younis Makhyoun, expressed the party's satisfaction with the constitution early on Sunday), the Brotherhood could use this chance to attract more floating Islamists away from the Nour's influence. However, it may be more advantageous for the Brotherhood to use the opportunity of the new constitution to strengthen and modify its "secular" critique of the interim government, especially in the light of increased tension of the last week provoked by a new protest law.
For instance, last week protesters fell afoul of the new law, with a score arrested during a demonstration in front of the Shura Council building on charges that the organizers failed to submit an application for a public demonstration to the Ministry of Interior three days in advance.
This tension is only likely to grow since the perceived illiberality of the 2013 Constitution is already a burning issue among revolutionary activists, especially on the articles relating to the role and reach of the military. If the Brotherhood chooses to attack the new Constitution from an anti-illiberal, rather than anti-secular viewpoint, it may be able to achieve some common cause with the non-Islamist revolutionaries.
It is important to mention here the deep-rooted enmity between the Brotherhood and the revolutionaries. For while the former blame the latter for illegally overthrowing Egypt's first elected president, the latter blame the former for the hijacking the 2011 Revolution through authoritarian and disastrously incompetent rule. Nonetheless, Al-Mesryoon is already reporting on a potential Brotherhood-revolutionary alliance.
The issue of religion in the constitution has come to the fore in a politically tense moment, and the Brotherhood faces new choices, even in its impaired state. Its reaction to the coming constitutional referendum may well reflect how it intends to regain some political momentum.
All views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, The Majalla magazine.
