Yemeni activist Tawakkul Karman (C) sits amidst members of the Yemeni military during a conference on restructuring the armed forces, on December 11, 2012 in Sana'a. (Mohammed Huwais/AFP/Getty Images)[/caption]While Egypt spasms, and Syria burns, it is easy to forget about Yemen, which has come close both to success, and to failure. Although many of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s placemen have been extracted from their nooks and crannies, others remain—and rumor suggests that some have been replaced by cronies from the new administration. Other rumors suggest that Ahmad Ali Saleh, the former president’s son, will return to claim his “inheritance,” and Yemen, having shuffled the power-players somewhat, will lapse back into its previous self-interested apathy.
Over the three decades that he was in power, Ali Abdullah Saleh killed, corrupted, or drove into exile all the opposition that he had the influence to subdue. Most of those over whom he did not have sufficient power, he co-opted into his patronage network. By the time the region’s other geriatric kleptocrats were forced from power, the loyal opposition was rather more loyal than oppositional—indeed, towards the end of his regime, some of the most effective resistance to Saleh’s rule came from within his own General People’s Congress.
The Yemeni media were likewise beaten, bribed or cowed into acquiescence, or fled abroad to seek safety. As elsewhere, official media channels became the vessels for the leader’s personality cult, while independent outlets observed red lines or were closed.
Then came the Arab Spring, with long suppressed hope buoyed up on a wave of new media, which gave voice and wing to demotic politics. New names and faces came to the fore, not members of the system who knew ‘the way things were done.’ They questioned cosy relationships, and exposed comfortable arrangements. Their tweets and blogs, YouTube clips and articles were as crucial to fueling the 2011 revolution as the marches, demonstrations and martyrdoms of the protesters.
Yet all too soon, the leaden hand of the system fell on the youthful optimists. The system extruded into the squares by means of the loyal opposition, who saw their positions—and, doubtless, benefits—challenged by Yemeni youth. Gradually, the opposition seized control of the stages, then the squares themselves, inserting their “security,” which secured the area, and stifled independent protest.
The spirited, independent youth from across a cornucopia of Yemen’s identities had rallied and resisted against all that the regime could hurl against them. But finally, they were stifled into inertia; not by Saleh’s baltaji thugs, but by the heavy hand of the system. All that remained were the airwaves.
Cometh the hour, cometh the man—and woman, too. The youth maintained their activism in the one sphere where their opponents had only limited sway. Blogs and newspaper commentary in English were augmented by YouTube clips, on-line activism, and---slowly---attendance at Western academic seminars, and even before the US Congress. The word was still getting out, even as proponents and sponsors stacked the decks of the GCC Initiative in favor of a re-branded status quo.
Yet slowly the numbers of these courageous young men and women diminished, by means fair and foul: Afrah Nasser fled to Sweden in May 2011. There was a scurrilous attack on Atiaf Al-Wazir via her French husband. Alaa Jarban took himself out of the game while in Canada. And most recently, Ibrahim Mothana died suddenly, aged 24. Although one commentator speculated that the cause of death may have been a heart attack, his appearance—as well as bearing witness to the immense strain he bore—suggested a more chronic condition.
While other eloquent Yemeni activists remain, their ranks have been badly thinned at a time when their country needs them most: when they can shine the light of truth onto some murky political and financial deals as the soi-disant elite divide up the country again. Their optimism and ethereal presence is vital as the mainstream media is beaten back into silence once more.
The challenge that the youth pose is less existential than the ‘barons’ of Saleh’s later years who sought to prevent the emergence of a jamlukiyya, an autocratic state in democratic clothing. However, most of the political actors in Yemen are also weaker and more vulnerable—so more inclined to eliminate threats. It is less likely that there will be a mysterious car crash, or another unexplained helicopter accident, but it is quite probable that attempts will be made to constrain and control the remaining voices, so that the snakes, who have shed their skins, can continue to dance in Yemen—Ali Abdullah Saleh used to say that ruling Yemen was like “dancing on the heads of snakes.”
If the West really wants a democratic Yemen to reappear, following the close of the National Dialogue conference next week, it must nurture and guard these frail stems through the factional frosts that now blight Yemen’s polity. Only then can they bloom again; hold the executive to account, and usher Yemen into a better future.
