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Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah, while championing Arab protestors in Egypt, Libya, Bahrain and Tunisia, is coming out in support of the embattled Assad. In a speech on December 11, Nasrallah pledged “to stand by the (Assad) regime, a regime of resistance,” even as the Assad government's crackdown on dissent has led to more than 5000 civilian deaths since the beginning of the uprising in mid March, according to the UN. Hezbollah’s support for the Syrian regime is prompting accusations from Arabs that it practices a double standard, protesters in Syria are increasingly hostile towards its stance and its leaders.
The confident public tone of Nasrallah on the Syrian government overcoming the “danger zone,” stands in contrast to the increased wariness voiced privately inside his party about Assad's fate. According to Randa Slim, the Middle East fellow at the New America Foundation, “Hezbollah is becoming increasingly aware that the deepening of the uprising is making it more unlikely for Assad to survive the crisis.” “They are preparing for the day after, and trying to avert the worst-case scenario whereby Assad is replaced with a pro -Western regime,” Slim tells The Majalla.
[inset_left]Since assuming power in 2000, the younger Assad has aligned Damascus closer to Tehran[/inset_left]Over the past three decades, it has been Syria's political and logistical support and Iran's funding and weaponry that have transformed Hezbollah into the strongest political and military body in Lebanon today. Late Syrian President Hafez Assad (1970-2000) oversaw the rise of Hezbollah. He took care to keep the Shia party in check, sometimes by strengthening its rival Amal, and ensuring that its role was limited to fighting Israel and not seeking political dominance inside Lebanon.
According to former US diplomats, the elder Assad understood the “red lines” when it came to the kind of arms it transported to Hezbollah and the influence Hezbollah was permitted inside Lebanon. These lines have became blurred under his son Bashar. Since assuming power in 2000, the younger Assad has aligned Damascus closer to Tehran and farther from the international community, repeatedly receiving Nasrallah in Damascus, welcomed Hezbollah's rising prominence in Lebanese politics, and has reportedly supplied Hezbollah with sophisticated weaponry. Last year Israel accused Assad of transferring long-range Scud missiles to the Lebanese party.
Inside Lebanon
Inside Lebanon today, Hezbollah appears “content” with its political standing and alliances, according to Paul Salem, the head of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. Salem tells The Majalla in a phone interview that for the time being Hezbollah wants to make sure the current government of Prime Minister Najib Mikati remains in power. He adds that “Hezbollah's presence in the government (dominated by its coalition) as well as their influence and relations with the Lebanese army is a source of ease over the situation inside Lebanon.”
Preventing the collapse of the Lebanese government was a driving reason behind Hezbollah's decision to go along with funding the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). The STL has indicted four Hezbollah members in the killing of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005, something that has been flatly rejected by Nasrallah who labeled the judicial body an “Israeli project.”
“The change of heart on the funding of the tribunal is the best indicator of the impact of the Syrian crisis on Hezbollah's calculus,” says Slim, adding that “the Party's leadership is starting to really think about the potential loss of Assad.” Their agreeing to a funding mechanism after Nasrallah publically opposed it comes from a realization “that the danger they face from Syria outweighs the danger they face from losing some of their political capital” among the Lebanese public.
The rise of a Sunni regime in Syria in the event of Assad's fall will also complicate the internal deliberations for Hezbollah. According to Salem, it will most likely empower the Sunnis inside Lebanon, and boost the Hariri camp and the Future movement. Even amongst Hezbollah's allies, rifts have surfaced in recent weeks. Nasrallah's key Christian ally General Michel Aoun has voiced some criticism over lack of support from Hezbollah on issues related to fighting corruption and increasing the minimum wage. The Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, whose support was key to forming this government, has been escalating his criticism against Assad. Most recently he sided with France over Hezbollah in blaming the last UNIFIL attack on “the neighbors.”
Dire Strategic Consequences
On the regional level and in the median future, the possible collapse of the Syrian regime will bring dire consequences for Hezbollah, explains Salem. Strategically, the fall of Assad will ultimately close the Damascus bridge linking Beirut with Tehran. While Salem does not see the flow of funds (estimated at 200 million dollars a year from Iran) as a major problem for Hezbollah to sustain, receiving heavy equipment will be a big challenge, as it depends on “land routes.” “The sea is not safe because it is internationally monitored, and the (Beirut) airport can be shut down in no time” says Salem.
Additionally, it will be difficult for Iran to sustain its transfers of arms to Hezbollah if the Assad regime collapses or Syria is splintered by sectarianism. Salem notes that the areas along the borders of Iraq and Syria are largely Sunni and Kurdish, in contrast to Shia Iran.
Comments by Bourhan Ghalioun, the head of the Syria National Council (SNC), Syria’s largest opposition group, have made matters still harder for Hezbollah. Ghalioun stated in an interview with the Wall Street Journal recently that “there will be no special relationship with Iran” in a Post-Assad Syria, and that “breaking the exceptional relationship means breaking the strategic, military alliance.”
Iran, according to a senior US official, is hedging its bets on Syria and reaching out to members in the opposition out of fear of what the Post-Assad situation might bring. Western sources tells The Majalla that Tehran has tried to reach out through North African channels to Mr. Ghalioun and other members in the SNC, while already opening talks with the Coordinating Council Committees inside Syria. In Washington's view, Iran, while “still supporting the Assad regime, sees him as falling, and is trying to get off the sinking ship.”
Both Salem and Slim agree that it will be difficult to predict the direction that Hezbollah might take after Assad. A lot will be depend on the future situation of Syria and the kind of transition that will take place in Damascus. While funding the tribunal shows Hezbollah's willingness to make compromises inside Lebanon and accommodate its allies for political survival, it is unlikely this will translate into bigger issues related to Hezbollah's weapons. “We will never let go of our arms,” Nasrallah assured his supporters.
Nevertheless, a post-Assad Syria will make Hezbollah “more exposed to US and Israeli threats,” according to Salem. The stakes are high for Hezbollah: “if the nuclear crisis is not resolved with Iran ... or if no major breakthrough is achieved in the Arab-Israeli conflict,” the party will remain a problem for both Israel and the United States, adds Salem.
“A repetition of 2006 [war between Hezbollah and Israel] remains possible in the median term,” Salem concludes. Except that in a Post-Assad Syria, “rearmament will prove to be more difficult.”
