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The rise of Islamist movements in the aftermath of the Arab Spring is representing both a challenge and an opportunity to the West as it looks to successful democratic transitions and maintaining its security and strategic interest in the broader Middle East.
The victory of Ennahdha moderate Islamic party in Tunisia, the solid support (35 percent) enjoyed by the Muslim brotherhood in neighboring Egypt, and the participation of Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood in the new Syria National Council established in Istanbul last month, as well as the embrace of the head of Libya’s National Transitional Council Mustafa Abdul Jalil of “the Islamic Sharia as the main source of law,” are several indications of the growing importance of political Islamist movements in the Arab world. The roots of these movements in Arab societies—going back to 1928 in the case of Egypt—in addition to their organizational capacity which trumps other liberal and leftist groups, is giving them an edge in filling the void left by the departing dictators in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya.
[inset_left]The shifting political status quo makes the new Islamist movements key players in the democratic transitions ahead[/inset_left]
Undoubtedly, the shifting political status quo makes the new Islamist movements key players in the democratic transitions ahead, and a force that representatives of western governments must reckon with as they each try to maintain their influence in the region. However, the Islamists’ foreign policy agendas, oriented by rejecting imperialism and opposing Israel, pose a challenge for the West.
The Challenges
Speaking to The Majalla about the rise of Islamic parties, Nathan Brown, author and expert on Arab politics and Islamist movements, suggests the key question is “whether they can be integrated as regular political actors without dominating the system.” The Iranian model embodies that risk, as Iran transformed into a military theocracy after its revolution that overthrew the authoritarian Shah in 1979.
For the West, Brown sees some bumps in the road as Europe and the US try to remain engaged and protect their vital security and strategic interests. He cites the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as one example, as well as counterterrorism and the US regional security presence. Since the fall of former President Hosni Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has made clear its intent to “rethink” the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel if it takes power.
The Camp David peace agreement signed in 1978 between Cairo and Tel Aviv is, from the US perspective, “a corner stone for stability in the region,” Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs Tamara Wittes told The Majalla. “Both Israelis and Egyptians have benefitted from peace and stability it produced. We absolutely see the peace agreement as central; we want to see that commitment sustained,” Wittes adds—even as Egyptian hostility towards Israel increases. Attacks in early September on Israel’s embassy in Cairo prompted Tel Aviv to withdraw its ambassador.
The other challenge for the West is to acquaint itself with the new actors that the Arab Spring has brought to the table. “The days where the US” and others “can view the domestic situation in the Arab world through the eyes of the rulers are over,” says Brown and the “challenge for the Obama administration is to build an American policy that is not around movements or individuals, but around political systems.” This will be a new way of doing things, according to the expert, and closer to how the US operates in Europe. Up until 2007, Washington did not have any direct contact with Egypt’s Muslim brotherhood, and not until last June did US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton welcome dialogue with members of the group who are not members of the Egyptian parliament.
Wittes confirms the administration’s contact with Egypt’s Brotherhood today, and most political groups in the country, emphasizing that “there isn't one set of policy towards the Muslim Brotherhood” but rather “one set of policy towards all political actors across the region who want to engage in elections and in democratic politics.” The criteria for such a policy was laid out by US President Barack Obama when he spoke in Cairo in 2009, and has three pillars at its core, explains Wittes: a “commitment to nonviolence to achieve your political goals”; a “commitment to the democratic rules of the game—after the elections as well as before”; and “a respect to equality in society for everybody including women and minorities.” The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has renounced political violence since 1972, after former President Anwar Sadat allowed it into the political system.
To Brown, however, reaching out to such groups is not an end in itself and should be accompanied with “building relationships with the entire society, and that doesn’t happen effectively by declaring certain actors off limits,” actors such as Hamas in the Palestinian territories. While many European countries have relations with Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Washington has no official contact.
Another set of complications might come from the Islamic movements themselves who have historically tried to keep distance from the United States, and derive much of their support from being anti-imperialist and opposing US policies in the region related to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and drone attacks in Pakistan and Yemen. Their ties to Iran—most evident through Hamas—are also alarming traditional US allies such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan dominates the opposition and has so far not been satisfied with King Abdullah’s announcement of reforms and changes to the power structure. Riyadh, on the other hand, has maintained good relations with the former head of states in Egypt and Tunisia, and views with caution the rise of the Islamist movements.
Qatar is an exception in its relations with the Muslim Brotherhood. Doha hosts Yusuf Qaradawi, the group’s most renowned spiritual leader, and has reportedly offered Hamas a new venue as an alternative to Damascus. It also played a crucial role in negotiating the prisoner exchange deal between Hamas and Israel and stands as a main ally for the National Transitional Council in Libya.
Opportunities
Islamist movements come in different shapes and sizes, from the moderate Ennahdha to the more conservative Salafists. While a wide common ground on policies might never be achieved between the West and different Islamist parties, there are many opportunities that the current dynamic brings. Wittes points to “lots of interests that we share with the people of the region on behalf of peace and stability, against nuclear proliferation and in rejecting violent extremism.” She adds that Washington “is acting on the premise that we have a lot in common, and we will have lot of common interest with democratic governments.”
Wittes suggests “democratic governments, because they are rooted in popular consent and because they represent their citizens, are stronger partners globally for the US.” A senior official who has worked for years on reform in the Middle East, her confidence stems from a rooted belief prevalent in the American experience that “open political systems are a good thing” and that “the more diversity you have in the political market, the better is the quality of the process.”
Another opportunity the changing status-quo brings is that it is opening a new chapter between these Islamist movements and the West. The support of the US, France and Britain for the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, preceded by the NATO campaign in Libya, is putting the Western allies ahead of others (notably Russia and China) in gaining the confidence of the new governing majorities. In many cases, there is a sense of historical righteousness and inevitability of the triumph of popular revolt that is driving Washington to embrace the revolutions and call on leaders with whom it did business to step down.
Another asset for the West is that the rise of the Islamist movements in the new regional dynamic has gone a long way towards diminishing Al-Qaeda, the number one enemy for the United States. “It [the Arab Spring] weakens Al-Qaeda,” says Wittes, adding in a joyous and empathetic tone that “one of the most beautiful things about the Arab Spring, and in Tunisia and Egypt in particular, is not only that these young people took their future in their own hands, and rejected the voices telling them to wait their turn, but they also rejected voices that said the only way to get things done is through violence and confrontation.” Wittes, who has followed the Middle East through its many ups and downs, sees “the commitment to nonviolence” as “something amazing to watch and a powerful repudiation of Al-Qaeda.” It also “presents an alternative positive vision, a democratic vision,” she says. “That is why there is so much promise.”
The success of democratic transitions in the countries undergoing revolution requires having the Islamist movements as a voice at the table. However, making sure that these groups do not dominate the process or stifle democratic progress will be as important for the West as it tries to influence the outcome and protect its core interests in the new Middle East.
