[/caption]
In a US diplomatic cable, released by WikiLeaks this summer, Egypt was described as “a major regional economic, political and cultural power. However, economic problems have frustrated many Egyptians. Egypt’s per capita GDP was on par with South Korea’s 30 years ago; today it is comparable to Indonesia’s.” The diplomatic cable would prove prescient. “There were bread riots in 2008 for the first time since 1977. Political reforms have stalled and the GOE [Government of Egypt] has resorted to heavy-handed tactics against individuals and groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, whose influence continues to grow.” While the intensity and widespread nature of the popular revolt that overthrew Mubarak stirred quite a sense of surprise, many observers have long looked at Egypt under the rule of Mubarak as a ticking bomb, one made of socio-economic and political grievances.
When the Arab Spring reached Egypt, right in the middle of the stand-off between the protesters and the regime was the Egyptian army. Faced with the tough choice between defending the regime—under which the army consolidated its position as Egypt’s most powerful institution—and siding with the revolution, the generals eventually opted for the latter. Although the army’s reluctance to use violence is to be praised, the choice to support change was not without strategic and self-interested considerations. Recognizing that saving Mubarak was beyond reach, the generals made sure the army would play a central role in securing a smooth transition to a post-Mubarak Egypt.
[inset_left]Much of the future political stability of the new Egypt, at least in the short term, is likely to rest on a delicate balance between the SCAF and the MB[/inset_left]
Several commentators have noted the irony of how Egypt’s popular revolution managed to topple Mubarak but then ended up in the hands of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), appointed by Mubarak himself. The Egyptian military is not only seen as representing much of the old order, it is also described as a state within state. As Wendell Steavenson of The New Yorker puts it, “the military establishment has long been the most powerful institution in the country and controls not just security and defense but also a huge economic sphere, including factories and road building and housing projects.”
Another political force to be reckoned with is the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Since the very beginning of the revolution in Egypt, various politicians and commentators have made clear their worries about a possible takeover of the popular movement by the MB, much like the 1979 Iranian revolution. When the revolt erupted, an Arab diplomat—quoted in The New York Times—described the Egyptian democracy movement as a train fueled by university students and human rights advocates. “Eventually those students will have to get off the train and go back to school, and the human rights people will have to get back to work, and you know who will be on the train when it finally rolls into the station? The Muslim Brotherhood.”
Much of the future political stability of the new Egypt, at least in the short term, is likely to rest on a delicate balance between the SCAF and the MB. For years Mubarak overemphasized the power of the MB in order to present his regime as a bulwark against their supposed threat and it remains difficult to estimate the real extent of the MB’s support-base among the population. Although nothing is decided, the Freedom and Justice Party—established by the MB—is the favorite to win the forthcoming November parliamentary elections, perhaps even with a majority, to the disquiet of many.
Once elected, the parliament will appoint a committee to draft a new constitution—the current charter has a temporary character, aimed at regulating the political process up to the November elections. Here lies much of the importance of the parliamentary elections. The bill of rights currently being written, as well as a document that stipulates the criteria to select the people that will form the constitutional committee, can be interpreted as a preemptive move to limit the power of the MB and other Islamic parties in the future parliament.
There are a number of issues that can provoke tensions between the SCAF and the MB. For one, the Freedom and Justice Party might call for a quicker transition to full civilian rule especially given the current public feeling that the revolution is somewhat stalling. This is something the army might not be ready to accept, especially not before the next presidential elections.
Another source of possible disagreement between the generals and the MB is likely to concern the role of Islam and Shari’a law in future Egyptian politics. De-secularizing Egyptian politics has long been one of the most important political aspiration of the MB. Where the army and the MB are surely at odds is the rapport with Israel. The recent storming by protestors of the Israeli embassy in Cairo can be interpreted as a sign of a coming redefinition, propelled by the Egyptian public, of this relationship.
At least until the elections take place, however, it is unlikely that any major public disagreement will arise between the SCAF and the MB. Moreover, the MB will have to balance its ideology with more pragmatic political considerations, something which they have been doing quite well up to this point. First and foremost will be not antagonizing the SCAF. This will allow the MB to appoint its own presidential candidate, despite previous declarations dismissing this intention. The SCAF also has to be cautious not to marginalize such a powerful force as the MB, so as to avoid further accusations of being an obstacle to the democratic revolution.
A popular comparison at the moment is between the new Egypt and the apparently fruitful project in Turkey, in which Islam, politics and democracy coexist in a successful formula. The suggestion is that this model will lead Egypt towards happier days. This comparison, however, is rather misplaced as it ignores recent Turkish developments—Erdogan’s government has been able to curb, politically and constitutionally, the traditional influence of the army in Turkish politics. In this regard, Egypt still has a very long way to go.
