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After years of social disorder, sectarian conflicts, and indeed national humiliation, Iraqi nationalism is once again emerging as a strong political ideology to the extent that many Iraqi politicians need to exploit nationalistic discourses in order to boost their chances of remaining in power. A similar development has been taking place in the Iraqi Kurdistan which in turn implies that neither side will be willing to make compromises on various unresolved issues that have come to define the nature of relations between Baghdad and Erbil. Since 2003 U.S. forces have played a mediating role between Iraqi Kurds and Arabs but have failed to articulate and/or push for measures to build partnership between the two sides. Thus, situation along the trigger line could dangerously deteriorate once Americans are gone as evident in President Barzani's recent demand for an extension of U.S. military presence in Iraq.
At the same time, Iran has stepped up its efforts to expand its influence in Southern Iraq where it has a strong and well-established support base. The very fact that the U.S. army has now deemed it necessary to conduct covert operations against "Iranian elements" in Southern Iraq is, by and in itself, a testimony of this. Tehran is confident that there will emerge a political and security vacuum in the immediate aftermath of Americans' departure, and hence it is determined to exploit that space to its own, and its Iraqi allies, advantage. In fact, the ongoing anti-regime protest in Syria and its negative effects on the viability of Tehran-Damascus-Hezbollah axis will only work as an extra incentive for Tehran to seek to compensate for any potential strategic loss in Syria by increasing its influence in Iraq. Iranian activism in this regard is of a dual nature: arming Shia militias in the South while pressurising/bribing its supporters in the Parliament to vote against an extension.
And to make matter worse, Iraq and Kuwait, two countries that share a small border and big history of mutual suspicion and war, are locked in a dispute again; this time, over the Mubarak al-Kabeer Port which Bagdad claims Kuwait is building by encroaching on its territorial waters. Baghdad is concerned that the construction of the Mubarak al-Kabeer will choke off its only access to international shipping lanes. "With this project, Kuwait has laid the cornerstone to put an end to Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations", said Aliyah Nisayef, an Iraqi lawmaker who collected more than 70 signatures from MPs denouncing the planned port. Although it seems unlikely that the tiff could escalate into another conflict in the immediate future, it could cause tension between the two neighbours in the long run given that Iraqis are skeptical of the Kuwait's intention asking: "why has Kuwait, with its hundreds of miles of coastline, positioned its port where it directly juts into Iraq's only access to the sea?"
[inset_left]The Obama administration is reported to be considering staging American troops in Kuwait as a "backup or rotational" training force for Iraq should the Pentagon be forced to complete the scheduled withdrawal of its current 45,000-strong force in December[/inset_left]
Taken together, these three factors should suffice to persuade the Iraqi government and Parliament to support an expansion of the US military presence in Iraq. In fact, the core of the Iraqi government is in favour of an expansion. Yet the trouble is that political constituencies in Iraq are mainly opposed to the American presence seeing U.S. forces as occupiers who must be "kicked out" of their land; a desire that Iraqi politicians cannot possibly ignore if they want to get re-elected.
To be sure though, there ought to be no doubt that even in the worst case scenario a limited number of U.S. forces, in the region of 1,000 to 2,000, will be permitted to remain in Iraq so they can train the Iraqi armed forces. However, a limited presence of this sort will not be adequate for the perseveration of Iraq's fragile socio-political stability; it only makes Americans extremely vulnerable to suicide/militia attacks.
Aware of this, the U.S. government seems to be drawing up a 'plan B' for its involvement in the Iraqi theatre. Given its geographical location as well as its strong ties to the U.S. military, the Obama administration is reported to be considering staging American troops in Kuwait as a "backup or rotational" training force for Iraq should the Pentagon be forced to complete the scheduled withdrawal of its current 45,000-strong force in December. To this end, the administration would foresee the Kuwait arrangement lasting for three years, starting in 2012, with troops rotating into Iraq for six-month stints.
In addition to the training mission, Pentagon is also keen to position a small U.S. combat force in Kuwait which could "rush into Iraq" in the event of a "security problem" or to "target an insurgent threat". In this scenario, U.S. government will retain in Kuwait some of is so-called "pre-positioned war materiel" or ground combat equipments which have to be pulled out of Iraq.
This is a positive development, and a relatively good substitute for having troops on the Iraqi soil, that should be, and most probably will be, welcomed by both Arab states as well as the Iraqi government. In this way, not only Kurds will feel safer, but also Tehran will be less likely to stage an all-out incursion into Iraq's political and security spheres. Having U.S. forces on standby in Kuwait also ensures that any potential flare-up between Baghdad and Kuwait will have a diplomatic solution.
