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Recent remarks by President Ahmadinejad’s top advisor and close ally, Ali Akbar Javanfekr, have shed some light on yet another setback for Iran at a time of increasing diplomatic and economic isolation. In a highly publicized interview, Mr. Javanfekr, a controversial figure in Iranian politics, has bluntly criticized Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, accusing her of “destroying years of good relations and striking against everything that [former Brazilian President] Lula accomplished.” Given the special bond between Ahmadinejad and Javanfekr, his remarks should be considered as the official view of the President’s office—if not the regime, for which it would have been undiplomatic to stage such an attack on the Brazilian leader. Mr. Ahmadinejad was keen to have a photo opportunity with his Brazilian counterpart while touring Latin America, but Brasília (unlike in 2009) simply refused to host him. Needless to say, this has angered the President’s inner circle—not least because standing next to the female leader of a flourishing democracy would have boosted the President’s standing domestically and internationally.
[inset_left]Brazilian officials might have decided that wherever their national interests allow, cooperation with the United States could serve their UN Security Council ambitions.[/inset_left]The whole Brazil-Iran fuss began in 2003, when Petrobras obtained exploration and drilling rights in the Caspian Sea in a $34 million agreement. However, it was in early 2009 when political affection between the two countries caught the world’s attention. Fairing strongly through the 2008 global financial storm, confident of its rising global power, soaring popularity at home, and relatively free of domestic political strains as he was in his last year at the office, President Silva, in line with his outward looking foreign policy agenda, which had already strengthened Brazil's foothold in Africa , and Brazil's foreign policy principle of South-South approach to globalization and development, sought to increase Brazil's presence and influence in the Middle East.
To be sure, Brazil’s newly-articulated regional strategy was not limited to Iran. This is evident in the Brazilian-backed Mercosur free trade agreement with Israel, the offer of free trade agreement to Jordan, as well as the decision to recognize a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. Yet, Iran was prioritized for a number of reasons.
Registered as the seventh-largest uranium reserve in the world and in possession of indigenous enrichment technology that it had mastered before joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1997, Brazil has been trying to become a global supplier of nuclear fuel. Silva saw a profitable market in Iran’s nuclear industry. Moreover, based on its own experience in the 1960s when US attempts to constrain its civil nuclear development led Brasília to establish a secret nuclear program in the 1970s, Brazil was—and still is—skeptical of Western sanctions, seeing them as a prelude to war and a major incentive for Tehran to obtain a nuclear deterrent. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Brazil saw a rare opportunity in Iran’s standoff with the West to make a broader argument about the nonproliferation regime that, according to Brazilian officials, has become a politically-driven tool in the hands of the United States to selectively lay down the law on weaker states.
For its part, the Iranian regime was thrilled to receive such positive attention from Brasília. Tehran has traditionally used its trade policy as a way of discouraging some countries from cooperating with sanctions or aligning themselves too closely with the anti-Iran camp. As such, it wasted no time in opening up its market to various Brazilian businesses and trade volume between the two countries increased substantially reaching $2.1 billion in 2010. Following Brasília’s announcement in early 2009 that it had begun uranium enrichment on an industrial scale, Tehran was hopeful to expand nuclear cooperation with Brazil. Iran was also keen to establish ties between Brazilian and Iranian banks, so as to gain indirect access to the US financial system.
It was in this context of warming relations that Brazilian and Iranian presidents exchanged official visits in 2009 and the Tehran Declaration was signed. This new activism had two broad objectives: to present Brazil as a mediator and enabler to justify its calls for a permanent UN Security Council seat, and to diversify Brazil’s trade relations and seek new partners for the Brazilian economy.
Since the election of the new President, however, diplomatic and trade relations between Iran and Brazil have followed a downward trajectory. In a sense, this should not come as a surprise. As someone who has been tortured herself, President Rousseff had made it crystal clear that she would “distance herself from Lula’s more exotic foreign policy initiatives,” and that would “influence Brazil’s diplomatic partnership with Iran.”
There are two other factors at play: Brazil’s own decision to build nuclear-powered submarines and a general shift in Brazil’s foreign policy orientation.
On 16 July 2011, plans for a Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine that had been postponed since the 1970s were reintroduced in a public ceremony attended by the Brazilian President and the Defense Minister. Brazil’s recent disinterest in Iran and its nuclear program could thus arise from its desire to deflect excessive attention on—and speculation about—its program, and Brasília’s end-goal in building nuclear submarines.
Negative reactions to Brazil’s rather short-lived adventurism in the Middle East, on the other hand, seem to have convinced Brasília to reduce its role in the region and instead devote all its energy to its near-abroad and Africa, especially that Brazil is self-sufficient in oil. Brazil’s cozying up with Iran, its support for Tehran Declaration, and its pro-Palestinian stance angered Washington and Israel. The further Silva went in his Iran-Middle East initiative, the more problems he created for Brazilian businesses, which are heavily integrated with the West. Not only did Washington not appreciate the nuclear deal with Iran, but it also threatened to restrict Brazil’s access to US financial and technological sectors at a time when Brazil’s new discovery of underwater oil and gas deposits has made it dependent on American high-technology firms.
Watching the recent Indo-American rapprochement, Brazilian officials might have decided that wherever their national interests allow, cooperation with the United States could serve their UN Security Council ambitions better than mediation on issues that are of paramount strategic importance to the US government. Surely, business friendly government of Brazil can help Washington in Latin America and Africa in return for US backing of its UNSC bid.
During the final years of Mr. Silva, Brazil experienced a steep learning curve in the region, realizing that it has neither the administrative structure nor the trained and experienced diplomats to handle the religious, ideological, and political complexities prevalent in the Middle East. The new administration has therefore set its eyes on Africa, especially the Portuguese-speaking nations, while reducing its Middle East agenda to trade only. Brazil hopes that its experience in biofuels and food security will offer alternative solutions to Middle Eastern countries, while continuing to sell its coffee, sugar, and meat—all of which are in high demand in the region. Over the medium term though, Brazil could make a political comeback in the region through a partnership with Turkey. Ankara has been seeking to increase its presence in Africa since 2005. As a relative newcomer, however, Turkey is likely to rely on Brasília’s soft power in order to achieve its goals in certain parts of continent. Cooperation in Africa, in turn, might pave the way for the emergence of a Turku-Brazilian partnership in the Middle East and North Africa.
