[/caption]Much to the credit of Israeli analysts and politicians, who were arguably the first bunch to predict the revitalizing effects of Arab Spring on political Islam, it is now indisputable that the Arab Awakening has empowered, and will continue to empower, Islamist forces in the Middle East and North Africa; so much so that it is no exaggeration to say that governance in the 'new Middle East' will have a strong Islamic flavor. In course of a month, elections in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia have empowered Islamist parties giving them the right to lead coalition governments for the very first time in modern history; a development that will be likely replicated in Libya, Algeria, and Yemen once elections are held.
If winning elections is a matter of organization and ideological cohesiveness, Islamist’s rise to dominance need not to come as a surprise since their opponents possess neither of these assets. Thanks to their calls for social justice and a degree of egalitarianism, Islamists have been the most repressed yet active forces throughout the MENA with a well-established network of followers who are being mobilized to spread their cause. At the same time, they have a track record of success in their localities as they have traditionally endowed their constituencies with effective social safety nets offering jobs, education, and health care. Welfare programs put in place by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan are a testimony of this.
Islamism’s rise through what is commonly referred to as "the freest and fairest elections" in the history of region, in turn, provides one with a valuable clue on the role of Islam in Middle East politics and future of secularism. Islam is a powerful socio-political force in the Muslim world, with an extraordinary capacity to generate a language of justice. Its capability to function as an integrative force in combination with deeply embedded Islamic consciousness in Arab societies makes Islam a precious political currency with which Arab regimes, including the secular ones, have traditionally justified their domestic and foreign policies. As such, a more comprehensive understanding of the role of Islam in the politics of Arab societies requires a sharp focus on the state as "an Islamic actor on its own". Perhaps, it helps to recall that many Arab states appealed to Islam in order to calm protestors in the initial phases of the Arab uprising. On January 19, for example, Mohammed Rifa al-Tahtawi, spokesman of Al-Azhar, asserted that "sharia law states that Islam categorically forbids suicide for any reason".
Such references to Islam and the recent surge of Islamists victories in elections, therefore, indicate that secularism or separation of Islam from politics is neither a possibility nor a desired outcome in the Arab world. No doubt, Islamists did not play a major role in this year's popular uprisings. Still, it was largely the Islamic beliefs of protestors that enabled them to risk their lives and stage protests on streets in spite of unprecedented brutality. Unlike Christianity in the West, Islam, it can be inferred, is not only a way of life but also a political force and a mobilizing factor that will continue to shape and influence the socio-political realities of the Arab world more visibly than it has in the recent past.
The Arab public today is expressing a strong desire for "accountable governments" that guarantee civil rights and fairness. A new system, put differently, that recognizes and cherishes pluralism, tolerance, and accountability. Secularism per se does not guarantee these. It ought to be noted that all the countries that are undergoing a 'transitional period' were once secular states headed by secular leaders. As such, secularism is a failed experiment for the Arab population. Not only did it not lead to modernity and prosperity, but it was also intolerant, unaccountable, and corrupt. It is hence natural to see the public entrusting Islamists with political power as they seek to eliminate both dictators and the deeds of dictatorship.
This may seem "menacingly Islamist" in certain corners of the world not least because it is unclear how Islamic revivalism can affect Israel-Palestine conflict, women and ethnic minority status in the region, and groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. Overall though, there are grounds for optimism. Islamists themselves are proving more pragmatic than it was initially assumed. As they obtain power, they are realizing that they no longer can afford the luxury of political rhetoric. Instead, they need to articulate policies and deliver results if they are to maintain their hold on power. Aware of the national and international sensitivities over their electoral success, their need to have constructive relations with the West so to have international legitimacy, and the difficult task of governance, they seem to be opting for plurality but not majority as evident in their calls for the formation of "unity" governments with the more liberal/secular parties.
The International community should therefore accept the public choice and embrace the Islamists for as long as they operate within the norms of international law. Exclusion and/or marginalization do not help the cause of democracy in the Arab world; instead, it only helps to empower radicals. Engagement, on the other hand, legitimizes moderate Islamists and also enables both sides to talk to and not just talk about each other. Simultaneously, the international community should try to strengthen civil institutions and promote press freedom in the region so to ensure a degree of socio-political plurality by enabling the public to continue to take an active part in decision making processes and keep governments accountable. To this end, Islamist and liberal/secular forces suspicions of each other's end goals could greatly facilitate efforts to encourage civic activism and media freedom.
