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A combination of domestic, regional, and international factors were at play when Turkey decided to forgo the "isolationism and dependency" of its pre-World War Two and Cold War eras in favour of a more pro-active foreign policy in its former Ottoman space. Beginning in the early 1990s, this strategy of "re-discovery" was significantly accelerated with the election of AKP in 2002 and was dubbed as "zero problems with neighbours".
The 'zero problems' policy, however, was never a realistic option for Turkey. Given the historical depth of Middle East's political rivalries and Turkey's imperial past, it was naïve to assume that Ankara could establish and maintain friendly ties with all the regional actors. Although it brought certain economic advantages at its initial phase, it did so by pushing Turkey into close contacts with the ruling elites. Consequently, Turkey, rather unintentionally, surfaced at the centre of every single major development needing to satisfy a dizzying portfolio of divergent demands without having the required diplomatic and military means for doing so. And to add insult to injury, its failure led to condemnations from all sides. Iranian and Arab discontent with Ankara's balanced approach towards the Syrian uprising is a case in point.
[inset_left]Turkey is well-equipped to pursue an independent foreign policy and become a regional power[/inset_left]
Realising this and surprised by the extent of U.S. unconditional support for Israel, Turkish foreign policy has now evolved into a new phase; one in which Turkey abandons her zero problems fantasy and her role as a bridge between the West and the East, and instead pursues an independent foreign policy based on its own national interest. Erdogan's recent "three-country tour", the near collapse of relations between Tel Aviv and Ankara, and the rising military tensions in the eastern Mediterranean over exploration rights are all indications of this new approach.
Recent democratic reforms in Turkey have had two distinct yet interrelated effects on Turkey's foreign policy outlook. For the very first time in its recent history, foreign policy is now under full civilian control with the military no longer capable of exerting influence over the direction and objectives of Turkish diplomacy. Generals, thus, cannot be expected to support a pro-Western agenda, as they have traditionally done, because the democratically elected government of the day is held accountable for foreign policy decisions. This in turn leads to the second effect which is government's increasing sensitivity to public opinion as is the case in other democracies. This is why Erdogan is unlikely to soften his stance on Israel unless Tel Aviv accepts to meet Turkey's demands. Pro-Palestinian and nationalist sentiments are widespread in the contemporary Turkish society, and that a u-turn on this matter could greatly endanger Erdogan's standing amongst the electorates.
At the same time, Turkey's continued economic growth in the face of the current global crisis, its remarkable success in achieving societal cohesion by needling the gap between secular and religious forces, and its boosted standing on the world stage as a role model for Arab revolutionaries have enhanced both the public and government self-confidence and assertiveness. In the background of constant EU rebuffs on mainly cultural and ideational grounds, therefore, Turkish society is now demanding an independent and slightly more Eastern-oriented foreign policy agenda at a time when Europe is faced with "deep stagnation". Hence, AKP, which has routinely used foreign policy to expand its electoral base, is left with no option but to be responsive.
Domestic politics aside, the dramatic changes in the broader global context caused by the financial crisis of 2008-9 have also influenced the perception of policymakers in Ankara. Chief among them is the ever increasing importance of regional blocks in global politics as a multipolar world order gradually takes shape. Turkish leadership is keen to behave "as a kind of independent regional power similar to the democratic members of the BRIC". And the revival of the Palestinian plight on the conscience of the regional elites and the diminishing American/Western influence/popularity in the background of an ongoing Arab Spring has provided Turkey with an opportunity to just do that. Aware that this could cause unease amongst Arab nations, however, Ankara has sought to expand ties with Egypt in order to defuse any potential Arab criticism of its 'hegemonistic tendencies'. According to the Turkish Foreign Minister, "a partnership between Turkey and Egypt could create a new, democratic axis of power". "This is what Turkey wants", he stated.
From now on, therefore, Turkey should be expected to act more independently and less in concert with the U.S. and Europe. Given the Eastern-bound transformation of global (economic) power, the new realities of the post-Arab Spring Middle East, Turkey’s geography, its strong traditions of statehood and nationhood along with its NATO and G20 memberships, and its historical ties to the Islamic world, Turkey is not only well-equipped to pursue an independent foreign policy and become a regional power, but its desire for doing so is, simply put, natural. As Turkey rises, however, there will be attempts by other regional aspirants to "take it down". At stake, thus, is not an independent foreign policy per se, but the style and the language of this new initiative. Ankara needs to maintain a neat balance between self-confidence and over-confidence as well as its Western and Eastern orientations. Failure to do so will almost certainly be detrimental to Turkey's national interests in the long term.
