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The idea of a Middle East nuclear weapons free zone (MENWFZ) was first mooted by Egypt and Iran in 1974. They jointly sponsored the first UN General Assembly resolution the same year which has been adopted by consensus ever since 1980. Yet, and notwithstanding high hopes and sincere efforts for the creation of such a zone, nothing tangible has been achieved. In fact, the prospect of a nuclear arms race is, more than ever, present especially if Iran succeeds in militarizing its nuclear program.
[inset_left]Regrettably, there is no reason to believe that the 2012 conference can make any headway towards the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the region.[/inset_left]
Therefore, it was no surprise to regional experts that the 2010 NPT Review Conference, similar to the previous occasions, failed to make a breakthrough towards the creation of MENWFZ: It only managed to call on the UN Secretary General, the three co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution—the US, UK, and Russia—and regional governments to convene a conference in 2012 "on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the states of the region."
Regrettably, there is no reason to believe that the 2012 conference can make any headway towards the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the region. Instead, it is likely that each state will bring its own narrow agenda to the table, seeking to secure their own national interests. Given the political turmoil in Egypt, Cairo's leadership cannot be taken for granted, while the GCC states are reluctant to assume a leading role given their concerns with political costs of such endeavor.
In addition, a united Arab front is also unlikely given the different threat perceptions of the GCC and Egypt/Jordan. Gulf States see Iran's nuclear program as the main threat to their national security, while Egypt and Jordan are worried about the Israeli nuclear arsenal. As for Iran, suffice to say that Tehran will attend the conference in order to "exploit Arab divisions" while simultaneously seeking to shift the attention to Israel's nuclear weapons. For their part, Israelis, should they decide to send a delegation, will likely stick to their old doctrine of "peace first, then disarmament."
On a more abstract level, the establishment of a nuclear free zone requires regional organizations where regional actors can collectively arrive at certain norms and procedures with regard to defense and intelligence cooperation so there can be more transparency and information sharing over their respective civil, nuclear and military capabilities.
Alas, historical patterns of enmity and amity in the region and the resulting zero-sum mentality of regional states does not allow for such institutional development. Given the absence of civil organizations and/or domestic constituencies supportive of the MENWFZ, it should not be surprising that little progress has been made on this front. Evidence from other free zones shows that without the public pressure, governments are unlikely to terminate their nuclear programs let alone abandon their bombs.
The only piece of good news, perhaps, is that the main rationale behind regional actors’ drive towards/obsession with nuclearization is now being challenged. So far, nuclear weapons have been viewed favorably because they are thought to compensate for asymmetrical power deficiencies, thereby appearing as the most effective form of deterrence. This may no longer be the case in the not too distanced future as cyberspace and cyber capabilities gradually change the nature of warfare and defense.
Until recently, it was commonly believed that cyber power, if/when employed autonomously, falls short of emerging as an independent coercive instrument capable of driving a nation to terminate a program or policy. In other words, cyber power was best understood as a 'complementary' instrument of power which, from a strategic point of view, can only enhance the ability of a nation to manipulate an adversary's—domestic or external—perceptions of the strategic environment to its own advantage.
Not anymore. At Check Point’s Sydney conference last week, Check Point Israel security analyst, Tomer Teller, revealed that the code in Stuxnet, which was used to take control of Bushehr nuclear facility in June 2009, could be modified to launch new SCADA attacks. "Nuclear warheads are controlled by computers so if someone manages to slip a worm inside a facility that will reach the warhead component, they could launch it and then aim it back at the country’s facility," he asserted.
What this implies is that the technology to turn cyber weapons into disruptive and destructive forces is either in existence or being developed, and thus possession of nuclear weapons—or simply the know-how—can no longer guarantee national security in the same way that it so far has. In fact, such weapons might make the host nation extremely vulnerable to cyber-attacks; especially given the remote and indirect nature of cyber activities make retaliation extremely difficult, if not impossible.
As such, regional governments may be better advised to spare some time and take stock of the "revolutionary effects" of cyber technology on the nature of future wars. There may very well be great strategic benefits in an early investment in the development of defensive and offensive cyber capabilities as opposed to a narrow focus on nuclear weapons.
