Politics

How Lebanon's Sunnis became ‘orphans' of the republic

While religious institutions representing other sects were able to play a role in shaping social safety nets in the dire four-year crisis, the Sunnis have been largely abandoned

Andrei Cojocaru

The modern politics that left a major group under-represented during a national crisis were shaped by complex historical forces. Al Majalla explores the plight of Lebanon's Sunni Muslims.

How Lebanon's Sunnis became ‘orphans' of the republic

Houssam Itani

last update on 13 Dec 2023

Mount Lebanon is a place shaped by complex historical forces.

Following a harsh crackdown by local princes loyal to the Ottoman Sultanate, the Maronites began migrating from their traditional areas in northern Lebanon towards the south, which was under Druze control. Consequently, profound changes occurred in the social power structure of the mountains, which enjoyed a degree of independence from the centre in Istanbul.

This shift during the 16th and 17th centuries led to the disintegration of the prevailing structure among the Maronites, who were organised within various clans and tribes.

The old system of allegiance still persists in some areas of northern Lebanon, where families remain affiliated with the area’s feudal heritage, bearing in mind that this term is used differently here than the way it is in European socio-political history.

As we shall see, similar forces combined to produce a very different outcome for the area’s Sunni Muslims. Understanding this history is vital because it shaped the significant differences in the positions of the various religious groups in the Lebanese system to this day.

An overview of the processes helps explain the current power balances.

Maronite migration

Migration to the south brought about a new system of loyalties to regulate the affairs of the Maronites in the districts of Keserwan, Metn, Shouf, and the surrounding areas.

The loss of influence by the old feudal families over the groups that settled in mixed areas home to both Druze and Maronites prompted a search for a new form of organisation that quickly surfaced in the Maronite Church, which also relocated its headquarters from the north to Keserwan.

Although the Maronite Church maintained a summer residence in the northern town of Diman, Keserwan witnessed coexistence between an old Maronite feudal family, the Khazens, and the Maronite Church. The Khazens soon realised the significant momentum enjoyed by the Church as a representative of all Maronites and rallied under its banner.

Understanding the history of Mount Lebanon is vital because it shaped the significant differences in the positions of the various religious groups in the Lebanese system to this day.

AFP — Snow covers the summits of Mount Lebanon as seen from downtown Beirut on February on February 2, 2022, with the Maronite Cathedral of St George and the Mohammed al-Amin mosque seen in the foreground.

Ottoman influence

Mount Lebanon's socio-political structure was highly influenced by the Ottoman Empire, which divided the population into two categories: urban dwellers and mountain residents, whom the Ottomans classified as tribes and clans.

Urban inhabitants, regardless of their sects, were obligated to pay taxes, while mountain residents were exempted due to their classification as tribes — similar to other tribes in the empire.

Maronites – who had a significant presence in Aleppo – paid taxes as urban residents, while Maronites in the mountains were exempt.

The disintegration of tribal and clan structures in regions densely populated by Maronites – such as Keserwan, Shouf, and areas further south – strengthened the leadership position of the Maronite Patriarchate.

It continued its traditional policy, maintaining relations with Christian centres in the West, particularly in France and Rome. And so, elements of social and political power within the Maronite community were consolidated.

As Maronites shifted from being peasants and refugees to landowners with vast estates and tangible influence, their status was further elevated after the defeat of Ibrahim Pasha and his withdrawal from the Levant.

Additionally, the end of Muhammad Ali Pasha's attempt to overthrow the Ottoman Empire in the early 19th century, along with economic developments with European centres, increased Maronite self-confidence and their ability to challenge the Druze princes.

This marked the beginning of three decades of protracted civil war between the Druze and Maronites, which peaked in 1860 when the Druze achieved both a military victory and a political defeat. Throughout this complex period, the Maronite Church emerged as the true political powerhouse of the region.

Centre of power

With European support, the Maronite Church established its position as an indispensable centre of power in all matters related to Mount Lebanon. This region transformed into the heart of Greater Lebanon after the withdrawal of Turkish forces at the end of World War I.

The autonomy gained in the aftermath of the 1860 war — under the name "Mutasarrifiyya of Mount Lebanon" — an administrative division or district during the Ottoman Empire prompted discussions about the area's fate.

To this day, it remains challenging for any Maronite Lebanese politician to openly oppose the orientations of Bkerki — the Maronite Patriarchate in Keserwan — without facing repercussions.

For example, the attack by Michel Aoun's supporters on Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir in 1990 during the War of Liberation is a dark moment in the history of the Free Patriotic Movement, established by Aoun.

Another instance is the mockery of Patriarch Sfeir by the leader of the Marada Movement, Suleiman Frangieh, in 2005. Frangieh belongs to one of the feudal families that maintained its leadership in the North, relying on the traditional structure that weakened among the Maronites.

Remarkably, the commitment to an independent Lebanon did not resonate with all Christians. For instance, the Orthodox community – affiliated religiously with the Orthodox Patriarchate in Damascus – produced prominent advocates of Arab and Syrian unity that transcended Lebanese identity.

AFP — Pope Francis (R) shakes hands with the Patriarch of the Syriac Orthodox Church, one of Lebanon's Christian leaders, in 2021.

Read more: Timeline

As Maronites shifted from being peasants and refugees to landowners with vast estates and tangible influence, their status was further elevated after the defeat of Ibrahim Pasha and his withdrawal from the Levant.

Sunni influence in the shade of history

Lebanon's Sunni Muslims are currently facing a dual crisis that has become more of a burden than that carried by other groups in the country. Their story, too, is shaped by the historical forces at work in the area.

The regions that would constitute the Lebanese Republic were, for much of Islamic Arab history, part of the areas ruled by the Caliph or the Sultan, whether in Baghdad or elsewhere.

An exception might be during the rule of the Fatimids preceding the Crusades to the Levant, including the coastal areas where Sunnis were concentrated. Muslims returned to their previous relationship with authority during the Ayyubid and Mamluk rule, continuing to the Ottoman era.

As such, the Sunni religious institution did not enjoy independence from authority and did not face the problems experienced by Christians, Druze and Shiites.

This was reflected in how the group's power structures developed, with significant implications later. It meant Sunnis were not present as a unified sect during the negotiations defining Lebanon's borders.

Their representation at conferences held in Europe and Syria – whether to discuss the areas vacated by the Turkish army or those declared by the Arab state – occurred only at the level of local dignitaries rather than as representatives of Sunni Muslims.

It is no secret that changes affecting the position of religious authority in the Ottoman state had wider repercussions in the territory under its control. This includes the position of the Grand Mufti in Lebanon, where Sheikh Tawfiq Khalid – who assumed the position of Grand Mufti in 1932 during the French mandate – succeeded Sheikh Mustafa Najjar, appointed by an Ottoman decree.

Assassinations

The subordination of Dar al-Ifta under the Lebanese Prime Minister – the highest political position attainable by a Sunni Muslim based on Lebanon's sectarian division of roles – significantly weakens Dar al-Ifta's ability to perform independently compared to the Maronite Patriarchate.

Sunni religious figures who tried to take on more prominent political roles were often assassinated, like Grand Mufti Hassan Khaled.

AFP — Lebanon's late Mufti of the Sunni Muslim community, Sheikh Hassan Khaled (R), with fellow Sunni scholar, Sheikh Sobhi al-Saleh, both assassinated in the late 80s at the peak of the 1975-90 Lebanese civil war.

He was the most politically powerful Grand Mufti in Lebanon's history, which put him in confrontation with many forces dominating the Sunni arena until he was killed in 1989 by a large explosive device that targeted his car.

While religious and political institutions representing other sects were able to play a role in shaping social and humanitarian safety nets in the dire four-year crisis, the Sunnis have found themselves largely abandoned.

Since then, religious figures have returned to a secondary position in the hierarchy of Sunni leadership in Lebanon, given the lack of independence from the political establishment and secular Sunni leadership.

Even though the Higher Islamic Shiite Council exists and includes Sunni community figures and their representatives in parliament, it is subject to the same limitations and reflects the prevailing conditions among Sunnis in Lebanon.

And so, the response from Lebanon's Sunnis to the harsh conditions that their country has gone through has been limited, leaving them more exposed now than other groups.

While religious and political institutions representing other sects were able to play a role in shaping social and humanitarian safety nets in the dire four-year crisis, the Sunnis have found themselves largely abandoned.

They do not receive any care from state institutions, which have gone on to almost collapse, or from civil organisations that other sects have succeeded in building at the expense of the Lebanese state.

The crisis faced by Lebanon's Sunnis is even worse as a result of this combination of history and politics and how it has muted their voice during the country's troubles. Political leadership has collapsed, and a lack of any alternative to it, alongside an exaggerated reliance on the state as a source of social and political protection.

All this comes in a country where the role of sectarian groups in a fractured state is more important with each passing day.

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