The fighting was intensified by the latest Yemeni government offensive, operation “Scorched Earth”, launched last August against the Houthi rebels. This offensive, for its size and intensity, placed the rebels under severe pressure. Feeling squeezed and suffering severe casualties, the rebels crossed the Yemeni-Saudi border, attacked Saudi border patrols, and took control of a mountainous section within Saudi territory. These actions naturally lead to a reaction from the Saudi security forces and the Saudi military.
After the clashes between Saudi border forces and the Houthis took place, with casualties on both sides, the Saudi government received the backing of the other GCC countries, as well as of Syria. Saudi Arabia simply defended its territorial sovereignty, and it has done so while in contact with the Yemeni government, as Prince Khaled bin Sultan, Assistant Minister of Defence and Aviation for Military Affairs, recently explained. For Saudi Arabia, it’s not only an immediate security issue of defending its territory. It’s also a strategic matter. The Saudis cannot afford to have a pro-Iranian armed group meddling in its territory.
Much speculation exists on Iran’s backing to the rebel insurgency. Iran’s support to groups such as Hezbollah, or the warning by Iran’s Foreign Minister, against foreign intervention in the Saada conflict, are two examples that fuel these speculations. The Yemeni government clearly believes such support exists, and it recently claimed it intercepted an Iranian ship carrying weapons and technical support for the Houthis. The Houthi rebels’ rhetoric also adds to this possibility. They justify their revolt against the Yemeni government partly for its close ties with the United States. In spite of all this, the Houthi’s leader, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, who spent much time in Iran for indoctrination, denies that his group receives Iran’s support.
Judging by what has been published by some Iranian press, it seems the Iranian government has an interest in portraying this conflict as a sectarian war. Considering that President Saleh and his establishment are Zaydis, as are the Houthis, such claims are not easy to justify. Moreover, history tells us that Zaydis have traditionally enjoyed good relations with Salafists in Saudi Arabia. As Professor Rashid Al Khayoun, historian of Medieval Iran emphasized, when it comes to Islamic law, Zayidi’s are Sunni in practice. Zaydis, to which the Houthis belong to, are the most moderate of Shia groups and the closest to Sunni Islam. In fact, Zaydis do not believe in many religious dogmas that Twelver Shiism professes, such as the notion of a hidden Imam.
All this, however, should not disguise the fact that, in times of conflict and deprivation, it becomes easier to influence people’s minds with propaganda. The Saada conflict is now being a stage of an exploitation of religious discourse to legitimize war. The Houthis have become a revivalist group, supporting the belief that the Zaydi identity is threatened by the Sunni or Salafi identity. Signs of migration of Yemeni Zahidi’s to Twelver Shiasm are already too apparent, and behind this migration are political and not religious reasons.
Being the poorest country in the Arab world, the Yemen’s mission of achieving stability and assuring harmony between its different sects is surely a massive one. However, the Yemeni government has done little to address the economic and social demands of either the northern or the southern Yemeni population. This scenario, together with the everyday violence that characterizes Yemen, creates the atmosphere for the episodes that we are now witnessing. And there is the potential for the situation to worsen, if the economic climate, wealth distribution, and political representation do not improve. With the southern threats of separatism, al-Qaeda’s strong presence in the country, and the Houthis rebellion in the north, one can imagine several possible appalling scenarios.
Armed groups and other non-state actors only survive under very specific conditions. One of them is state weakness, of which the situation in Yemen is a good example. Another is the logistical and financial support from foreign governments. In the case of the Houthis rebellion, it is difficult to discern if Iran is supporting the Houthis in any other ways than ideological backing. However, one thing is certain. Apart from Iran, nobody wants another Hezbollah in the north of Yemen, creating tensions in Yemen and beyond.
Manuel Almeida
