Since fighting resumed between Hezbollah and Israel on 2 March, the Lebanese government, led by Nawaf Salam, has sought to contain the escalation through a negotiating track in Washington. In April, it succeeded in reaching a partial de-escalation agreement under which Israel undertook not to target Beirut and its southern suburbs, in exchange for Hezbollah halting its rocket fire on settlements in northern Israel.
The previous Lebanese government, led by Najib Mikati, had reached a ceasefire agreement in November 2024, to which Hezbollah consented at the time, even though it allowed Israel to remain stationed at five border points, gave it latitude to pursue its fighters across Lebanese territory, and failed to guarantee the return of residents to the area south of the Litani River.
The paradox is that, after the fourth round of direct talks between the Lebanese and Israeli delegations concluded in Washington a few days ago, and after both sides had reached a draft for a new ceasefire agreement, Hezbollah tore up the ceasefire altogether. This was despite the fact that its provisions closely resembled those of the 2024 agreement. Both, for instance, call for a complete cessation of fire by Hezbollah, the handover of its weapons to the Lebanese state, the withdrawal of its fighters from areas south of the Litani River, and the deployment of the Lebanese army there.
Hezbollah's rejection of the deal is a stark reminder of the futility of the Lebanese state negotiating on behalf of a participant in the conflict, without the consent of the party actually directing the war, namely Iran. Moreover, it reinforced the prevailing impression that the Lebanese government does not have the final say on questions of war and peace, and that ceasefire negotiations in Lebanon remain bound to the Islamabad track.
