2026 will test the foundations of 'the new Syria'

Progress without consensus

With the near-complete formation of the new parliament, the transitional roadmap—the national dialogue, the constitutional declaration, and the creation of interim representative bodies—is now formally in place. On paper, these steps sketch the basic architecture of a post-authoritarian political order. In practice, they have exposed unresolved tensions over legitimacy, representation, and the direction of the new state.

President Ahmed al-Sharaa has been eager to present each phase as participatory and inclusive. Committees were formed to consult notables, communities, and civil-society actors, gathering input for the national dialogue, the drafting of the constitutional declaration, and the design of emerging institutions.

These processes were intended to project transparency and break with the exclusionary practices of the previous regime. But the speed, sequencing, and tightly managed nature of these processes generated sharply mixed reactions. Supporters hailed the milestones as historic and argued that, in a fragile transition, centralised decision-making is necessary to maintain cohesion and prevent drift.

Critics saw something else entirely: a rushed, top-down process that concentrates excessive authority in the presidency, with no meaningful checks or balances. For them, the deeper fear is that the new system may not truly break from Assad's one-man rule.

Concerns have been further sharpened by the prominent presence of HTS-linked figures within the government and security institutions, fuelling anxieties about emerging political monopolisation at a moment when broad inclusion is essential to rebuild trust.

The formation of parliament has only deepened these divides. The formation of parliament has only sharpened these divides. While it fulfils the roadmap's formal requirements, it has reignited long-standing doubts about its representativeness and whether the legislature will wield real authority to deliver the changes so widely desired.

In short, the political transition has advanced, but without the consensus, trust, or legitimacy needed to anchor it.

Gains on quicksand

If diplomacy has been the most visible success of the transition, and rightly so, the economy is where the limits of early progress are felt most acutely. Al-Sharaa has made economic revival a central pillar of his roadmap: reducing import taxes, announcing a 200% salary increase for civil servants, and courting investors to signal that Syria is open for business.

For a brief period, these measures delivered tangible results. Inflation eased dramatically,  dropping from roughly 110% in February 2024 to around –15% a year later, driven by customs reforms, reduced trade barriers, and a temporarily stronger currency. But the relief was fleeting. Inflation has since surged back, with rising prices quickly outpacing wage gains. Even after the salary hike, the minimum wage of SYP 750,000 still covers only about one-third of the cost of a basic monthly food basket.

To the government's credit, the supply of essential goods has improved. Electricity provision has increased substantially, in some areas reaching ten times the levels available under al-Assad. Fuel shortages have eased. Bread is once again reliably accessible.

Yet these achievements came at a steep cost. Electricity, fuel, bread, and transport prices have all risen sharply after subsidy restructuring. Syrians now spend a larger share of their income on basic goods than at any point since 2011, a mounting source of frustration that cuts across political divides.

While the transitional authorities cannot be held responsible for the structural roots of Syria's economic collapse—decades of corruption, war, and mismanagement—it is their handling of the crisis that has drawn growing criticism. A top-down approach to policymaking, a rapid shift toward market liberalisation, and the removal of subsidies at a moment of extreme financial and social vulnerability—all without meaningful public consultation—have left many Syrians struggling not only to cope, but to stay patient.

The result is an economy that shows signs of recovery on the surface yet remains structurally fragile and increasingly politically explosive.

Snails' pace justice

Justice and accountability—long among Syrians' core demands—have advanced more visibly this year than at any point in recent memory, yet they remain tightly circumscribed by political and structural limits.

The landmark trial linked to the March coastal violations marked a historic rupture with Assad-era impunity. For the first time, members of the security forces were publicly prosecuted: proceedings were televised, defendants had legal representation, and testimony was debated openly. For communities long accustomed to secrecy and denial, this signalled a profound symbolic shift—the suggestion that even the security apparatus is no longer immune from scrutiny.

Prior to that, the government publicly acknowledged the violations that occurred in the cost and Sweida, established fact-finding missions, and pledged to hold perpetrators accountable. In an unprecedented move, it also allowed international organisations access to probe these violations.

But despite these advances, the justice agenda remains deeply constrained. The authorities have prioritised accountability for post-Assad abuses while deferring any broader reckoning with decades of regime-era crimes. Politically, this reflects two calculations: first, that demonstrating accountability for recent violations bolsters the government's image abroad at a moment of heightened scrutiny; and second, that the government views sweeping prosecutions of former regime personnel as a risk to the fragile calm.

But these calculations are not the only reasons. Syria lacks the legal infrastructure required for comprehensive transitional justice. The criminal code does not recognise war crimes, crimes against humanity, or enforced disappearances, and without an empowered parliament to pass the necessary reforms, the justice system's tools remain limited.

While these challenges are daunting, the absence of any measures to hold former regime figures accountable carries mounting costs. Communities long traumatised by repression view selective justice as yet another form of injustice. The lack of credible pathways for redress fuels resentment and pushes some toward informal justice or revenge.

The recent attacks on Alawite neighbourhoods by Sunni tribesmen, sparked by a criminal incident reframed in sectarian terms, showed how quickly violence can ignite when institutional justice is seen as absent or biased.

A fragile calm

The security landscape also witnessed a mix of notable stabilisation and deep structural fragility. To the authorities' credit, Syria avoided the large-scale violence many predicted would follow al-Assad's fall. Armed factions were brought under the Ministry of Defence, and initial discipline among security forces prevented revenge killings at a volatile moment.

But that stability has been repeatedly tested by sectarian flashpoints. The March coastal violations and July unrest in Sweida exposed the limits of control over newly merged forces. Undisciplined units carried out abuses, revenge killings, and disproportionate operations, deepening mistrust between communities.

Still, recent developments suggest some institutional learning. The government's rapid intervention in Homs following tribal attacks on Alawite neighbourhoods prevented a wider sectarian confrontation. Coordinated deployment, consultation with local notables, and tighter operational control kept the violence from spiralling—a contrast to earlier, more reactive responses.

Similarly, the decision to protect, rather than suppress, recent Alawite protests in the coastal region marked a notable shift. Security forces were instructed to safeguard demonstrators, restrain local units, and allow grievances to be publicly aired—an approach that helped defuse tensions rather than inflame them.

These improvements matter. But they do not resolve core problems: a fragmented security sector, weak discipline, and units still tied to local commanders rather than central command.

A narrowing window

Syria's first year of transition has delivered a series of breakthroughs, but it has also revealed the limits of a model built on centralised authority, managed participation, and delayed hard choices.

Stabilisation and diplomatic breakthroughs have bought time, but not indefinitely. Public expectations are rising faster than the state's capacity to respond, and the gap between official narratives and daily realities is widening. That is the real fault line now shaping Syria's trajectory.

The task ahead is no longer simply to maintain order, but to confront the structural questions avoided in year one: how power is shared, how justice is delivered, how security forces are governed, and how economic burdens are addressed. These debates may be difficult, but postponing them is far riskier.

Last year demonstrated the promise of transition; the next will test its foundations.